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In the field of biotechnology, fledgling efforts are under 
way to establish open source projects.1  Borrowing concepts 
from the open source software movement, these projects create 
cooperative exchanges in which life science inventions are 
openly available to a broad research community.2  The projects 
                                                          
 * Assistant Professor, U.C. Hastings College of the Law.  I am grateful 
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 1. See Stephen M. Maurer et al., Finding Cures for Tropical Diseases: Is 
Open Source an Answer?, in BIOTECHNOLOGY: ESSAYS FROM ITS HEARTLAND 
33, 33-36 (Lynn Yarris ed., 2004) (discussing convergence of computing, 
biology, and open source for drug discovery), available at 
http://www.bayeconfor.org/pdf/BioTechReport.pdf; see also ABOUT THE 
INTERNATIONAL HAPMAP PROJECT [hereinafter HAPMAP PROJECT] (promoting 
utilization of open source techniques in developing a haplotype map of the 
human genome), at http://www.hapmap.org/abouthapmap.html (last modified 
June 4, 2004); BIOINFORMATICS.ORG, 2002 ORGANIZATION PLAN (explaining 
the mission of Bioinformatics.Org is “providing free and open resources for 
research, development and education”), at http://bioinformatics.org/about/plan-
20020920.pdf (Sept. 20, 2002); Pamela Jones, Interview: Public Patent 
Foundation's Dan Ravicher (explaining the Public Patent Foundation’s goal of 
developing a system of protected commons for markets that are hampered by 
the presence of so many patent rights that it is difficult for researchers to 
operate), at http://lwn.net/Articles/64378/ (Dec. 23, 2003); Graeme O’Neill, 
‘Open-Source Biology’ Stance Earns International Honour, AUSTRALIAN 
BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS (describing BIOS), at 
http://www.cambia.org/downloads/Biotechnology_News_Dec_03.pdf (Mar. 12, 
2003); Anna Salleh, Push to Free up Biotech Tools for All, ABC SCIENCE 
ONLINE (describing plans to assemble groups of enabling technologies that 
together provide the pieces necessary for a particular form of research 
investigation), at http://www.abc.net.au/science/news/stories/s999733.htm 
(Dec. 1, 2003).  See generally An Open-source Shot in the Arm?, ECONOMIST, 
June 10, 2004, at 17 (discussing open source in biotechnology), available at 
http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=2724420. 
 2. See, e.g., HAPMAP PROJECT, supra note 1 (describing the HapMap 
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are aimed at solving problems in underserved communities, 
cutting through patent thickets, and ensuring that the 
biotechnology tools required for research and innovation are 
openly available.3 
Building on the software notion of “copyleft,” some open 
source biotechnology projects use the power of the patent 
system to ensure that the core technology of the project and any 
innovations remain openly available.  For example, under 
ordinary principles of patent law, those who make 
improvements in the core technology would be entitled to apply 
for patent rights on the improvements.4  As the technology 
advances, these improvement patents could lead to rights 
splintering in which so many people hold pieces of rights to a 
particular technology that access is hindered.  In response to 
this problem, open source biotechnology projects often require 
participants to agree that advances in the technology must 
remain as openly available as the original technology.5 
Such agreements may implicate the doctrine of patent 
misuse.  Patent misuse is defined as an impermissible attempt 
to expand the time or scope of the patent beyond the patent 
grant.6  It includes attempts to expand the patent power to 
things not included in the teachings of the original patent.  
Improvements in the core technology may not be within the 
teachings of the original patent.  Thus, when open source 
                                                          
Project’s goal of ensuring biotechnology tools are openly available). 
 3. See id.; Jones, supra note 1; see also Maurer, supra note 1. 
 4. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 368 
(1938) (noting “most inventions represent improvements on some existing 
article, process or machine”); Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 2d 
1148, 1155 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (“Patents are and should be granted to later 
inventors upon nonobvious improvements.”), reh’g denied, 2004 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 12762 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 5. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL HAPMAP PROJECT PUBLIC ACCESS LICENSE, 
[hereinafter PUBLIC ACCESS LICENSE] (requiring that users agree to not 
reduce others' access to the data and to share the data only with others who 
have made the same agreement), at http://www.hapmap.org/cgi-
perl/registration#liTerms (Aug. 2003); see also O’Neill, supra note 1 
(explaining users agree to grant back any improvements in the core technology 
and to make such improvements freely available to all others on the same 
terms that BIOS provided for the original core technology). 
 6. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 
343 (1971) (noting that the Court has condemned attempts to broaden the 
physical or temporal scope of the patent monopoly), remanded on other 
grounds, 334 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Ill. 1971), affd, 465 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1972), 
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1061 (1972); see generally 6 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM 
ON PATENTS § 19.04 (2003) (discussing patent misuse). 
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biotechnology licenses require that advances in the technology 
must be made available to others on the same open terms as 
the original technology, the open source group may be using the 
power of the patent grant to reach an invention outside the 
original patent.  When a patent holder appears to expand the 
scope of the patent beyond the patent grant, the question is 
whether the behavior is impermissible, as measured by the 
tests within the patent misuse doctrine. 
In recent years, the Federal Circuit has revised the 
doctrine of patent misuse to mirror the federal antitrust laws.7  
The Federal Circuit currently tests for patent misuse by 
looking for anticompetitive effects through application of the 
antitrust rule of reason.8 
Despite the Federal Circuit’s recent focus, relevant 
legislative and judicial precedents suggest that patent misuse 
should be tested by reference to patent policy and not antitrust 
law.9  Under this approach, patent misuse in open source 
biotechnology arrangements would be evaluated based on 
whether the effects of the behavior are inconsistent with patent 
policy.  This article applies both of these tests to determine 
whether open source arrangements should be considered patent 
misuse. 
The primary goal of the patent system is to promote the 
progress of science for the public benefit.10  As the United 
States Supreme Court explained in 1945, “[t]he primary 
purpose of our patent system is not reward of the individual 
but the advancement of the arts and sciences. Its inducement is 
                                                          
 7. See Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for 
Patent Misuse, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 399, 421-31 (2003) (discussing development 
of the law in the Federal Circuit). 
 8. See, e.g., Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992) (holding that in a patent misuse inquiry, the appropriate criterion is 
whether the patent holder has ventured beyond the patent grant and into 
behavior having an anticompetitive effect not justifiable under the rule of 
reason); see also Va. Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 868-69 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997) (evaluating Mallinckrodt, Inc. criteria and identifying certain 
practices constituting per se patent misuse), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 815 (1998); 
C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys. Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(evaluating Mallinckrodt, Inc. criteria), reh’g denied 161 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 
1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1130 (1999); B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 
124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (evaluating Mallinckrodt, Inc. criteria); 
Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 467, 469 (D. Del. 2002) 
(applying the Federal Circuit test), aff’d, 366 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 9. See Feldman, supra note 7. 
 10. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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directed to disclosure of advances in knowledge which will be 
beneficial to society; it is not a certificate of merit, but an 
incentive to disclosure.”11  To accomplish this ultimate goal, the 
patent system encourages innovation by granting inventors 
limited rights to exclude others from their invention.12  The 
patent system grants these rights recognizing that there may 
be undesirable effects in the short run which will be offset by 
the system’s ability to spur innovation over the long run.13 
As a general matter, the open source system is consistent 
with patent policy.  Accelerating the moment at which 
knowledge is widely available is consistent with patent policy’s 
design to bring inventions into the public domain for the public 
benefit. 
On a more detailed level, however, the open source system 
threatens to clash with patent policy.  The patent system uses 
economic rewards to promote invention.  If the open source 
system reduces the economic reward available to downstream 
inventors, this reduction may decrease the amount of long-term 
innovation.  A decrease in long-term innovation would be 
inconsistent with patent policy. 
Such an analysis, however, fails to consider all of the 
effects throughout the system across time.  Although open 
source biotechnology may decrease some downstream economic 
returns, it increases downstream non-economic rewards.  In 
addition, open source licensing may increase the level of 
downstream innovation by encouraging the exploitation of 
certain types of untapped.  Finally, open source arrangements 
decrease the harms of the current patent system by reducing 
patent thickets and avoiding the short-term restriction of 
supply that one would expect under traditional patent 
licensing.  For example, in granting a patent, the patent 
                                                          
 11. Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330-31 
(1945). 
 12. See Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) (explaining 
that the patent laws carry out the Constitutional mandate to “promote this 
progress by offering a right of exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to 
inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, research, and 
development”). 
 13. See Jay P. Kesan & Marc Banik, Patents as Incomplete Contracts: 
Aligning Incentives for R&D Investment with Incentives to Disclose Prior Art, 2 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 23, 23-24 (2000) (noting that patents “impose social 
costs such as reduced levels of competition or wasteful design-around efforts 
by competitors” but also create an incentive to invest in research and 
development that leads to innovation). 
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holder’s ability to exclude others from making, using, or selling 
the invention will suppress competition and restrict supply of 
the invention, at least during the patent term.14  Open source 
inventions, which are openly available from the start, do not 
create the same type of restriction of supply.  The overall effect 
of the open source system is to increase the supply of 
innovation and the speed at which such innovation is available 
for the public benefit, effects that are consistent with patent 
policy. 
If patent misuse is analyzed by testing for anticompetitive 
effects under the antitrust rule of reason, the results would be 
the same although the logic would differ at some points.  
Finding anticompetitive effects under the rule of reason 
requires finding market power, anticompetitive effects, and 
proof that the anticompetitive effects outweigh any pro-
competitive benefits.15 
Many open source products would not have market power 
in a properly defined market, given the availability of 
substitutes.  For example, the open source software Linux does 
not have market power in the operating system market given 
competition from other operating systems such as Windows.  If 
an open source group did possess market power, any 
anticompetitive effects of open source would have to be weighed 
against the pro-competitive effects. 
One might argue that open source arrangements could be 
characterized as an attempt by the original open source group 
to prevent the development of a downstream product that 
would be available on different terms.  Such behavior could be 
described as an attempt to reduce competition, which could 
restrict supply in relevant markets.  Behavior that restricts 
supply may be considered anticompetitive under the antitrust 
rule of reason. 
The open source group, however, is not trying to restrict 
the supply of available products.  It is trying to increase the 
supply of biotech tools that are available by ensuring that the 
                                                          
 14. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare & the Allocation of Resources 
for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC 
AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 617 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962) 
(noting that patent rights produce underutilization of information). 
 15. See Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“Every 
agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains . . . .  The true 
test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates 
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may 
suppress or even destroy competition.”). 
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tools in their most advanced incarnation remain openly 
available.  Thus, the effects of the open source system are 
better characterized as increasing rather than reducing the 
supply of relevant products. 
Finally, any anticompetitive effects of the open source 
behavior would be outweighed by the pro-competitive effects of 
reducing patent thickets and promoting the creation and 
dissemination of ideas without a short-term restriction of 
supply.  Thus, the effects of the open source biotechnology 
system should not be considered anticompetitive under the 
antitrust rule of reason, and therefore should not constitute 
patent misuse. 
Part I of this article describes the current open source 
biotechnology movement and its predecessor, the open source 
software movement.  Part II describes the doctrine of patent 
misuse.  Part III compares open source biotechnology licensing 
to three traditional patent licensing arrangements: field of use 
restrictions, grantbacks, and reach-through royalties.  It 
describes how the patent misuse doctrine has been applied to 
these arrangements.  Part IV examines whether open source 
biotechnology practices should be considered patent misuse by 
examining whether the effects are inconsistent with patent 
policy.  Part V considers whether open source should be 
considered patent misuse by examining whether the effects are 
anticompetitive as measured by the rule of reason.  The article 
concludes that although open source biotechnology practices 
may implicate the doctrine of patent misuse, they should not be 
considered misuse under either test. 
I. THE OPEN SOURCE BIOTECHNOLOGY MOVEMENT 
A. CURRENT OPEN SOURCE BIOTECHNOLOGY PROJECTS 
The open source movement in biotechnology offers a 
structure for cooperative exchange in the development of life 
science products that are either bioengineered or produced as a 
result of techniques that involve biotechnology.  The projects 
and their design are varied, but a common theme is the desire 
to make biotechnology advances available to a broad research 
community and to ensure that such open access continues.16 
                                                          
 16. See, e.g., HAPMAP PROJECT, supra note 1 (explaining that the project 
will release all the data it produces so that any researcher can use the 
information and that those who are granted access to the information shall not 
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The goal of many open source biotechnology projects is to 
counteract the phenomenon in certain research areas in which 
progress is hampered by the rights structure surrounding basic 
investigative tools.17  In some areas, the problem is simply the 
multitude of rights.  For example, transferring a gene to a crop 
plant may require dozens of individually protected and discrete 
technologies.18  Thus, a researcher trying to search for effective 
ways to genetically alter a particular plant for a particular trait 
will have to identify and obtain dozens of separate rights. 
Transaction costs are significant for commercial entities and 
may be overwhelming for poor nations, academic researchers, 
and other nonprofit entities that lack the resources to identify 
and negotiate all of the necessary rights.19 
Scholars have used the term “patent thicket” to describe 
the problem of multiple overlapping rights that can hamper 
innovation by creating transaction barriers.20  Most scholars 
                                                          
restrict the access to the Genotype Database or the data that it contains); see 
also CAMBIA, PHILOSOPHY GUIDING FUTURE REGISTRATION TO USE THIS SITE 
(“CAMBIA's philosophy is to ensure that access to resources, including the IP 
Resource, is affordable to any and all users.”), at 
http://www.cambiaip.org/legal/Terms/Payment_policy.htm (last visited Sept. 
11, 2004) O’Neill, supra note 1 (explaining users agree to grant back any 
improvements in the core technology and to make such improvements freely 
available to all others on the same terms that BIOS provided for the original 
core technology thus assuring that a broad research community will have 
continued access to those tools). 
 17. See Kenneth Neil Cukier, Open Source Biotech: Can a Non-proprietary 
Approach to Intellectual Property Work in the Life Sciences? (stating the 
current patent system is an encumbrance),  at 
http://www.cukier.com/writings/acumen-cukier-oct03.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 
2004); Jones, supra note 1 (listing “establishing patent commons within 
markets crippled by patent thickets” as one purpose of the Public Patent 
Foundation); Salleh, supra note 1; see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bargaining 
over the Transfer of Proprietary Research Tools: Is this Market Failing or 
Emerging, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 223, 
225 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001) (noting some scientists must 
wait months or even years before gaining access to tools while their 
institutions wade through the many patent licensing agreements). 
 18. See Robin Feldman, CAMBIA BIOS Initiative: Biological Innovation 
for Open Society (Mar. 29 2004) [hereinafter BIOS Rockefeller Application] 
(unpublished manuscript submitted as an application to The Rockefeller 
Foundation) (on file with author).  
 19. See id.; Cukier, supra note 17, at 56; see also Lita Nelsen, The Rise of 
Intellectual Property Protection in the American University, 279 SCIENCE 1460, 
1461 (1998) (noting that restricted availability or delays in exchange of 
research tools in biological research is a problem for university research). 
 20. See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, 
Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE 
ECONOMY 1, 1-2 (Adam Jaffe et al. eds., 2001), available at 
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and those reporting from the field agree that large numbers of 
rights hamper research and innovation, particularly in the 
biotechnology field.21  One study, however, has challenged the 
notion.22  John Walsh, Ashish Arora, and Wesley M. Cohen 
argue that firms simply work around the problem of multiple 
rights, for example, by moving offshore beyond the reach of 
patent rights, inventing around the rights, and using public 
research tools.23  In particular, they argue that academic 
researchers routinely ignore rights structures and that patent 
holders passively acquiesce.24  These options may not be 
available, however, to those with limited resources.  Inventing 
around a patent and jurisdiction dodging are expensive.  
Ignoring rights is a risky enterprise, particularly for those who 
have limited resources to defend against a charge of 
infringement. 
In areas not plagued by patent thickets, basic research 
tools may be controlled by one entity or a small group of 
entities.25  The cost of accessing these tools may be beyond the 
reach of nonprofit researchers and those targeting the problems 
of lesser developed nations, problems which are unlikely to 
generate great economic rewards. 
Some open source biotechnology projects are designed as 
cooperative ventures in which a community of scientists works 
together to solve a common problem.  For example, Stephen 
Maurer, Arti Rai, and Andrej Sali have proposed a “Tropical 
Disease Initiative” in which scientists from universities, 
laboratories, and corporations could work together on early-
stage development of drugs to fight tropical diseases.26  The 
project would revolve around a web site in which individual 
                                                          
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/thicket.pdf. 
 21. See id.; see also supra notes 17-19. 
 22. JOHN P. WALSH ET AL., RESEARCH TOOL PATENTING AND LICENSING 
AND BIOMEDICAL INNOVATION, at 
www.heinz.cmu.edu/wpapers/download.jsp?3d=2003-2 (Dec. 11, 2002); John P. 
Walsh et al., Working Through the Patent Problem, 299 SCIENCE 1021 (2003), 
(summarizing the lack of impact of upstream patents on research), available 
at http://tigger.uic.edu/~jwalsh/WalshetalScience.pdf. 
 23. See WALSH ET AL., supra note 22, at 41. 
 24. See id. at 42; see also John P. Walsh et al., supra note 22. 
 25. See BIOS Rockefeller Application, supra note 18. 
 26. See Maurer, supra note 2; see also Janet Hope, Open Source 
Biotechnology? (2003) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Australian National 
University) (discussing the potential for application of open source approaches 
to biotechnology), at http://rsss.anu.edu.au/~janeth/OSBiotech.html (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2005). 
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pages would focus on separate tasks such as identifying new 
drug targets, searching for new chemicals that affect targets 
already identified, and checking the feasibility of existing drugs 
on the targets.27  Identifying drug targets involves finding 
specific parts of the human molecular structure such as genes 
or proteins that play a role in the mechanism of a targeted 
disease process.28 For example, the genes that go awry in a 
particular cancer are often identified as drug targets in cancer 
research because they allow scientists to target the molecular 
mechanisms underlying the disease.29  In the Tropical Disease 
Initiative project, scientists would annotate a shared database 
each time they made a discovery related to the relevant drug 
targets, and the results could be discussed in internet chat 
rooms and at conferences.30 
A similar effort is underway in the HapMap Project, which 
is developing a specialized map of the human genome.31  The 
goal of the project is to develop a map that describes not the 
standard sequence of human DNA but rather common patterns 
of human DNA variation.32  The project began in fall 2002 and 
is expected to take at least three years to complete.33  The 
information generated by the project is freely available, 
provided that those who access the data do not restrict the 
access of others.34 
In particular, users must agree not to file patent 
applications for information contained in the database such as 
single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs).35  SNPs are sites in 
                                                          
 27. See Mauer, supra note 1, at 34, 37. 
 28. See generally Jürgen Drews, Drug Discovery: A Historical Perspective, 
287 SCIENCE 1960 (2000) (discussing the development of different types of 
drug targets and their uses). 
 29. See Jackson B. Gibbs, Mechanism-Based Target Identification and 
Drug Discovery in Cancer Research, 287 SCIENCE 1969, 1970 (2000); see also 
Aimee E. Belanger et al., PCR-Based Ordered Genomic Libraries: A New 
Approach to Drug Target Identification for Streptococcus pneumoniae, 46 
ANTIMICROBIAL AGENTS & CHEMOTHERAPY 2507, 2507 (2002) (describing the 
discovery process of drug targets to cure Streptococcus pneumoniae “by first 
determining which of the ordered amplicons yields resistant transformants 
and then examining the genetic content of the amplicon in question”), 
available at http://aac.asm.org/cgi/content/full/46/8/2507. 
 30. See Maurer, supra note 1, at 37. 
 31. See HAPMAP PROJECT, supra note 1. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See PUBLIC ACCESS LICENSE, supra note 5. 
 35. Id. 
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the human genome where the DNA sequences of many 
individuals differ slightly.36  Users must also agree that any 
patents filed for particular uses of the SNPs or other data in 
the Genotype Database will be licensed on terms that allow 
others free access to the data in the Genotype Database for 
other purposes.37 
Other projects, such as the Public Patent Foundation 
project, are envisioned as protected commons in which patent 
holders would agree to pool their technologies, which would 
then be freely available to all participants.38  The Public Patent 
Foundation plans to develop a system of protected commons for 
markets that are hampered by the presence of so many patent 
rights that it is difficult for any researchers, even those who 
hold patents themselves, to operate.39 
In each commons, patent holders would grant nonexclusive 
licenses to a public trust that would then make all of the 
technologies available to the participants.40  The commons 
would operate along the lines of a disarmament treaty that 
permits only bilateral participation.41  In other words, one 
cannot benefit from the patent commons without placing one’s 
rights in the commons as well.42 
Another project, the Biological Innovation for Open Society 
(BIOS) plans to operate as a combination of the cooperative and 
the protected commons approaches.43  BIOS plans to assemble 
groups of enabling technologies that together provide the pieces 
necessary for a particular form of research investigation.44  For 
example, a BIOS group, or node, might contain a core 
technology, or groups of technologies, necessary for introducing 
new genes into plants.  Such technologies would not have to be 
superior to existing commercial technologies.  They would just 
need to provide a sufficiently effective tool for engaging in the 
                                                          
 36. See HAPMAP PROJECT, supra note 1 (describing single nucleotide 
polymorphisms). 
 37. See PUBLIC ACCESS LICENSE, supra note 5. 
 38. See Jones, supra note 1. 
 39. Id. 
 40. E-mail from Dan Ravicher, Executive Director, Public Patent 
Foundation, to Robin Feldman, Assistant Professor of Law, University of 
California Hastings College of the Law (Jan. 13, 2004, 11:34 PST) (on file with 
author). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Salleh, supra note 1. 
 44. See id. 
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basic research such that developing nations, small 
biotechnology companies, and public research agencies will be 
able to engage in research without becoming ensnared in 
current patent traps.45 
BIOS founder Richard Jefferson uses a wheel-and-spoke 
analogy to describe his vision of groups of technologies that 
enable biotechnology research.  According to this analogy, 
biological technologies are interdependent, requiring several 
key components to function, just as a wheel requires a number 
of spokes in order to operate.46  BIOS hopes that it will be able 
to provide participants with complete packages including all of 
the spokes.47 
Although BIOS is in the planning phases, it has access to 
some technologies that may help propel its projects.  BIOS is an 
outgrowth of the Center for the Application of Molecular 
Biology to International Agriculture (CAMBIA).  BIOS now 
holds the rights to CAMBIA’s intellectual property. 48  Such 
technology includes D ArT, a patented genotyping, or gene 
mapping method, invented by one of CAMBIA’s scientists.49  
Other technologies include a method for introducing new genes 
into plants such that the resulting proteins will be expressed 
only in specific tissues such as roots, flowers, seeds, or leaves.50  
This technique bypasses a host of patents that researchers 
otherwise would have to navigate and has been successfully 
used in a Chinese project to create transgenic rice lines that are 
being evaluated for characteristics such as reduced water use 
and disease resistance.51 
In addition to the technology already developed, BIOS 
plans to establish cooperative ventures similar to those 
envisioned by Maurer, Rai, and Sali.  Individuals and agencies 
will be able to collaborate by creating technologies and working 
around existing blocks, with BIOS providing the cyberspace 
location and the structure for the exchange.52 
                                                          
 45. See O’Neill, supra note 1. 
 46. BIOS Rockefeller Application, supra note 18. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See Salleh, supra note 1. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See id.; O’Neill, supra note 1. 
 51. See O’Neill, supra note 1; see also Salleh, supra note 1 (describing 
CAMBIA’s work toward developing an alternative to the proprietary 
Agrobacterium transformation technology). 
 52. See BIOS Rockefeller Application, supra note 18; see also Maurer, 
supra note 1. 
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BIOS technologies will be available free of charge to 
anyone.53  Users will be required to sign a license agreeing to 
grant back any improvements in the core technology and to 
make such improvements freely available to all others on the 
same terms that BIOS provided for the original core 
technology.54  Without such an agreement, the core technology 
could lose its free access as those who improve the technology 
apply for proprietary rights to the improvements.  Over time, 
the core technology would become as encumbered as current 
technologies.55 
In contrast to improvements to the core research tool 
technologies, the BIOS license would permit users to patent 
any inventions created.  The BIOS founder describes the 
license in the following fashion: “‘Th[e] license will say you 
agree to share improvements in the core technology.  You can 
make your own applications as proprietary as you want; you 
can patent your invention.  But the tools to do that must be a 
public good.’”56 
Some open source biotechnology projects are centered on 
bioinformatics, a type of technology at the intersection of 
biology and software.  Bioinformatics uses software to generate 
and analyze data relating to bioscience research.57  Such 
projects tend to follow closely along the lines of their open 
source software predecessors.  Software is created and 
improved through an unstructured cooperative process.  
License agreements frequently mirror those available for open 
source software.  For example, several open source 
bioinformatics programming languages are available, including 
BioPerl, BioJava, Biopython, BioRuby, and others.58  These 
languages are available through standard open source software 
                                                          
 53. See O’Neill, supra note 1. 
 54. See id.; Salleh, supra note 1 
 55. BIOS also plans a database project using its comprehensive public-
access database that consists of the full text of patents relevant to agricultural 
biotechnology, both applications and patents granted, from the United States, 
European, and Australian jurisdictions with a user-friendly searchable 
interface.  See BIOS Rockefeller Application, supra note 18. 
 56. Salleh, supra note 1. 
 57. See Edward N. Trifonov, Earliest Pages of Bioinformatics, 16 
BIOINFORMATICS 5 (2000) (describing the early development of the field). 
 58. The Open Bioinformatics Foundation web site exists as a hub for 
supporting the languages.  See Open Bioinformatics Foundation, 
http://www.open-bio.org (last visited Sept. 15, 2004). 
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licenses.59 For example, BioJava is subject to the GNU Lesser 
General Public License, a license developed for open source 
software.60  The license grants freedom to copy the program, 
modify it, and distribute it to others for free or for a fee.61  
Among other things, the license requires that those who 
distribute or modify the program must make the source code 
available to other users and must make modified versions 
available on the same terms as the original version.62  Finally, 
the license requires that any patent license granted for a 
version of the original software must be consistent with the full 
freedom of use specified in the original license.63 
Most open source biotechnology software projects are 
nonprofit ventures.  Nevertheless, one South African company 
has developed a business model designed around open source 
biotechnology software.  The company, Electric Genetics 
Corporation, has released its bioinformatics software under a 
free open source license and provides validation and support 
services for a fee.64 
Open source biotechnology projects are at various stages of 
development.  Some, such as the South African company and 
the bioinformatics programming languages, have actual 
products currently in use.65  Others, such as the HapMap 
Project, are under way and moving towards their research 
goals.  Some, such as BIOS and the Public Patent Foundation, 
are in the active planning and design phases.  Still others are 
in the early concept phase. 
                                                          
 59. See the Open Bioinformatics Foundation web site at http://www.open-
bio.org for links to the languages and the relevant licenses. 
 60. See Open Bioinformatics Foundation, BioJava Project, at 
http://www.biojava.org/download/binaries/LICENSE (last modified July 2, 
2001). 
 61. See GNU Lesser General Public License, at 
http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/lesser.html (last updated Nov. 27, 2000). 
 62. See id. 
 63. See id.  For a list of other open source biotechnology projects, see 
Cukier, supra note 17. 
 64. See Cukier, supra note 17.  In 2002, the company organized a 
“biohackathon,” flying scores of open source programmers to South Africa to 
write code.  Id.  Kristen Philipkoski, Cure for South Africa’s Ills, WIRED NEWS, 
Apr. 8, 2002, at http://www.wired.com/news/medtech/0,1286,51533,00.html 
(last visited Sept. 6, 2004). 
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B. OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE: THE PREDECESSOR OF THE OPEN 
SOURCE BIOTECHNOLOGY MOVEMENT 
It is not surprising that the open source biotechnology 
projects farthest along tend to have significant bioinformatics 
elements.  The open source biotechnology movement has its 
roots in the open source software movement,66 and the easiest 
transfer of principles occurs at the intersection of biology and 
software where programs and databases are developed for 
exploring and managing biotechnology information.67 
                                                          
 66. For detailed discussions of the open source software movement, see 
generally RICHARD STALLMAN, FREE SOFTWARE, FREE SOCIETY: SELECTED 
ESSAYS OF RICHARD STALLMAN (Joshua Gay, ed., 2002); Marcus Maher, Open 
Source Software: The Success of an Alternative Intellectual Property Incentive 
Paradigm, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 619 (2000) (tracing 
the success of open source in software); Christian H. Nadan, Open Source 
Licensing: Virus or Virtue?, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 349 (2002)  (advocating 
open source as a great opportunity to commercialize and listing approaches for 
businesses to take advantage of open source); Lawrence Lessig, The Limits in 
Open Code: Regulatory Standards and the Future of the Net, 14 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 759 (1999) (suggesting that the open source movement will make it 
more difficult for the government to regulate the Internet); Joseph Scott 
Miller, Allchin's Folly: Exploding Some Myths About Open Source Software, 20 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 491 (2002) (rebutting the idea that open source is 
bad for capitalism because it supports the underlying purpose of copyright by 
disseminating information); Patrick K. Bobko, Open-Source Software and the 
Demise of Copyright, 27 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 51, 90 (2001) 
(arguing that open source software, by uncoupling the economic incentives 
from the creative process, has “subvert[ed] the foundation upon which the 
commercial software industry is built”); Mathias Strasser, A New Paradigm in 
Intellectual Property Law?: The Case Against Open Sources, 2001 STAN. TECH. 
L. REV. 4 (arguing that open source in copyright is flawed because it 
undermines the incentive purpose of copyrights by exposing commercial 
developers to too much risk); David S. Evans & Bernard J. Reddy, Government 
Preferences for Promoting Open-Source Software: A Solution in Search of a  
Problem, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 313 (2003) (arguing that 
software licensing is adequate thereby precluding any need for government to 
get involved and impose open source); Klaus M. Schmidt & Monika Schnitzer, 
Public Subsidies for Open Source? Some Economic Policy Issues of the 
Software Market, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 473, 488 (2003) (warning that open 
source development may create “forking” so that different programs will not be 
compatible with each other); Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and 
The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002) (providing an interesting 
study of how the open source movement defies Coase’s theory of organization, 
which states that production must be organized by the market or managerial 
hierarchy). 
 67. For a discussion of characteristics of the bioinformatics industry that 
are either well-suited or ill-suited for the open source model, see generally 
Open Source Genomics, Symposium on Bioinformatics and Intellectual 
Property Law, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 254 (2002) [hereinafter Symposium]; 
see also Maurer et al., supra note 1, at 33–35 (discussing the same set of issues 
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The open source software movement is grounded in the 
notion that end users should have the ability to study, change, 
modify, and redistribute the software they use.68 Most software 
is distributed in the form of object code, a series of ones and 
zeroes that can be read by computers but is unintelligible to 
humans, even skilled programmers.69  In order to modify the 
software, a programmer needs the source code, which is a 
compilation of the ones and zeroes found in the object code into 
a language that can be understood by those skilled in the art of 
programming.70 Without access to the source code, and the 
authorization to change it, end users must depend on the 
original software company to fix bugs, provide upgrades, and 
modify the program for individual requirements.71  In the fast-
paced and individualistic world of software programming such 
an arrangement seems excruciatingly slow and insufficiently 
attuned to the advantages of, and desire for, free intellectual 
exchange.72 
In contrast to this approach, open source pioneers 
developed a different model in which source code is distributed 
along with object code, and users are authorized to distribute 
and modify the program toward their individual ends.73  The 
most successful modifications are then reviewed and adopted 
by the broader user community. 
In many open source software projects, a group of 
developers will operate loosely as project managers guiding the 
incorporation of new code into the evolving program.74  Some 
open source software programs have begun with a contribution 
of software which is then provided to the community on terms 
                                                          
in relationship to open source biotechnology projects); Hope, supra note 26.  
Although open source has flourished within the world of software 
development, it has appeared in other disciplines as well.  See Thomas Goetz, 
Open Source Everywhere, WIRED MAGAZINE (Nov. 2003) (describing open-
source-like approaches throughout history), available at 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.11/opensource.html.  One 
commentator has suggested the following: “Coders, it could be argued, got to 
open source first only because they were closest to the tool that made it a 
feasible means of production: the Internet.”  Id. 
 68. See Nadan, supra note 66, at 353. 
 69. See Joseph Scott Miller, Allchin's Folly: Exploding Some Myths About 
Open Source Software, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 491, 494 (2002). 
 70. See id. 
 71. See Nadan, supra note 66, at 353. 
 72. See STALLMAN, supra note 66, at 16. 
 73. See id. at 18, 20-21. 
 74. See Nadan, supra note 66, at 352. 
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that allow modification and redistribution.75  Other open 
software programs begin as little more than an idea, which 
must then be developed into a project by the broader 
programming community.76 
A key problem for the open source software movement is 
the challenge of ensuring that, after the source code is released 
to the public, it remains available for future users to modify 
and distribute.  If developers simply renounce their copyrights 
and release the code into the public domain, those who make 
improvements would be able to make the improved version 
closed and proprietary.  For example, one who modifies the 
original program by adding functionalities or fixing bugs could 
claim to have created a derivative work based on a product in 
the public domain.77  The second comer would then hold an 
independent copyright on the derivative work and could 
exercise that copyright by releasing the derivative program 
solely in a closed proprietary fashion.78  If this happened, the 
open source project could quickly degenerate.  The best versions 
of the program might be proprietary, and the software could 
become closed. 
Ensuring continued open access to the program requires a 
creative twist on the notion of copyright protection.  Rather 
than releasing the information into the public domain, open 
source developers retain their right to control the product, 
exercising those rights only to the extent of trying to ensure 
that the product remains open for modification and 
distribution.  For example, many open source software products 
are licensed under the GPL, which requires, among other 
things, that enhancements and derivatives must be made 
available on the same open use and distribution terms as the 
original software.79  This approach has been called “copyleft.”  
                                                          
 75. See, e.g., Maher, supra note 66, at 623-24 (describing Netscape’s 
Mozilla license which controls its formerly closed browser software); Lessig, 
supra note 66, at 766 (noting Netscape’s contribution of its browser code to an 
open source project). 
 76. See Maher, supra note 66, at 622-23 (describing the evolution of 
Linux). 
 77. See Miller, supra note 69, at 495. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See Maher, supra note 66, at 638; GNU General Public License, at 
http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2004).  Other types of 
open source licenses include the Berkeley Software Distribution License and 
the EFF Open Audio License.  See Open Source, at 
http://www.opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php (last visited Sept. 7, 2004); 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, at  www.eff.org/IP/Open_licenses/eff.oal.html) 
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The phrase reflects the notion that participants use the 
copyright system, which normally operates to restrict the use of 
works, in a manner that keeps works free from restrictions.80 
The currency for those who participate in the open source 
software movement is different from traditional economic 
rewards.  Programmers volunteer their time and ideas and 
successful programmers are rewarded with prestige in the 
programming community.81  In addition, prestige within the 
programming community may translate into traditional 
economic rewards in that programmers who demonstrate skills 
in the open source community can trade on that reputation in 
the job market.82  Other rewards include the satisfaction of 
contributing to a body of knowledge and the joy of participating 
in an intellectual exchange.  One author describes these 
phenomena in the following fashion: 
Most who use and improve [open source software] do so with the hope 
of making a unique and lasting contribution to the body of knowledge 
or, in hacker terminology, coming up with a “cool” hack. For example, 
only hours after Netscape had released the code for its Internet 
browser, a group of Australian programmers “had attached a 
cryptographic add-on” that enabled Netscape’s program to conduct 
secure Internet transactions.  The Australians “were paid handsomely 
- but not with money. The programmers . . . got paid in respect from 
the rest of the programming community and in the satisfaction of 
turning out an elegant useful bit of software.”83 
The wish to participate in, and contribute to, the 
advancement of science may explain why individuals 
participate in National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s 
open source Mars project.  The project, which is part of the 
Mars mission, asks volunteer “clickworkers” to help identify 
millions of craters and draw a map of the planet.84 
Other rewards for participation in open source projects 
may include the appeal of altruism.  For example, the 
ThinkCycle project focuses on finding engineering solutions to 
problems that plague underserved communities and the 
environment.85  ThinkCycle, an academic nonprofit project, is 
                                                          
(last visited Sept. 7, 2004). 
 80. STALLMAN, supra note 66, at 20–21. 
 81. See Symposium, supra note 67, at 256; see, e.g., Maher, supra note 66, 
at 631-33. 
 82. See Maher, supra note 66, at 632. 
 83. Bobko, supra note 66, at 83. 
 84. See Goetz, supra note 67. 
 85. See ThinkCycle, at http://www.thinkcycle.org/about (last visited Sept. 
24, 2004). 
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the brainchild of a group of Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology students.86  It operates as an open source web-
based design collaborative.87  Among other projects, ThinkCycle 
has addressed a problem facing health care volunteers trying to 
fight cholera.  The challenge was to develop a kit to instruct 
local people on the use and calibration of IV equipment.88  
Easy-to-use systems cost $2,000 per patient, putting these 
systems beyond the reach of most communities facing cholera 
outbreaks.89  Less expensive systems were available but 
required skilled workers to administer them.  ThinkCycle 
designed a system that cost $1.25 to manufacture and could be 
administered by unskilled workers.90  Project volunteers 
presumably were motivated at least in part by the intangible 
rewards of helping desperately ill people in poor communities. 
Although most open source software endeavors offer 
intangible rewards to participants, not all eschew the more 
traditional economic rewards.  For example, some companies 
have been built on the concept of providing peripheral products 
and services to support the open source product.  For example, 
the Linux operating system was developed, and is expanded 
and maintained in an open source, collaborative process.  Red 
Hat, Inc. provides software support services and easy-to-use 
bundles of Linux for a fee.91  Red Hat did not develop the 
software on which Linux operates nor does it employ the 
programmers that maintain it.92 Red Hat does not control the 
future development of Linux and cannot direct any 
improvements made to it.93 Despite these limitations, Red Hat 
has generated sufficient business to “win the approval of 
financial markets and maintain [significant] market 
capitalization.”94 
In short, the desire to have software that can be freely 
                                                          
 86. See id. 
 87. See Lee Ridgway, ThinkCycle: Reaching Out to Solve Real-World 
Problems, 17 INFO., SERV. & TECH. THROUGHOUT MIT 3, at 1 (Jan./Feb. 2002), 
available at http://web.mit.edu/is/isnews/v17/n03/170301.html. 
 88. See id. at 2. 
 89. See Goetz, supra note 67. 
 90. See id. 
 91. See Red Hat, at http://www.redhat.com (last visited Apr. 15, 2004); See 
David McGowan, Legal Implications of Open-Source Software, 2001 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 241, 242-43 (2001). 
 92. McGowan, supra note 91, at 242. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
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understood, accessed, and modified has spawned cooperative 
ventures in software development.  Biotechnology researchers 
are borrowing and adapting these approaches in efforts to 
engage in collaborative research that can solve problems facing 
poor communities, trim patent forests, and make the tools of 
biotech innovation freely available. 
Following the notion of copyleft, some of the open source 
biotechnology projects use the power of the intellectual 
property system to ensure that the technologies they develop, 
and any future modifications, are no more restricted than the 
original technology.  In the biotechnology arena, however, the 
intellectual property rights regime is frequently patent rather 
than the copyright regime utilized in open source software.95  
In the patent context, the patent holder exercises its patent 
rights by requiring that those who use or modify the research 
technology agree to maintain the open nature of the core 
technology and any improvements. 
II. PATENT MISUSE 
A. WHAT IS PATENT MISUSE?  
Patent misuse is defined as an impermissible attempt to 
extend the time or scope of the patent grant.96  A patent is 
intended to convey exclusive rights in an invention, but those 
rights are limited by the twenty-year term of the grant and by 
                                                          
 95. Copyright is not the exclusive rights regime for open source software, 
nor is patent the exclusive rights regime for open source biotechnology.  
Software can receive patent protection in some circumstances as well as 
copyright protection.  Compare 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 
1.03[6][i], at 209 (2003) (explaining that some software is now patentable), 
with Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright 
Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L. 
J. 663, 665 (1984) (noting that software in machine-readable form is 
copyrightable).  Similarly, to the extent that a biotechnology invention 
includes software, the software may be eligible for copyright protection.  In 
addition, one scholar has argued that DNA sequences should be copyrightable 
as well as patentable. See Irving Kayton, Copyright in Living Genetically 
Engineered Works, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 191 (1982).  But see James G. Silva, 
Copyright Protection of Biotechnology Works: Into the Dustbin of History?, 
2000 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. Forum 012801 ¶3 (2000) (“[C]opyright 
protection for biotechnology works is either impermissible or of severely 
limited scope.”), at http://infoeagle.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/st_org/iptf/articles/ 
index.html; MICHAEL EPSTEIN, Protecting Biotechnology, in MODERN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 219, 230-31 (Supp. 1988). 
 96. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 
313, 343-44 (1971); 6 CHISUM, supra note 6, § 19.04, at 427. 
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the boundaries of the invention that was created. 
Acts that may constitute misuse include requiring patent 
licensees to buy unpatented goods, prohibiting production or 
sale of competing goods, and conditioning the license of one 
patent on accepting a different license as well.97  The finding of 
misuse rests on the notion that the patent holder is using its 
rights to garner a return from something not in the patent.  
The patent holder thereby improperly extends the scope of the 
patent to things not included in the teachings of the patent 
holder’s invention. 
For example, in Zenith Radio v. Hazeltine,98 the Supreme 
Court considered a package license in which the licensor would 
not grant licenses to individual patents, but insisted on 
granting licensees the rights to use any of the company’s 500-
odd patents in any of the licensee’s products for a five-year 
term.99  The licensor reserved royalties on the total sales of the 
licensee’s products regardless of whether the licensed patents 
were used in the manufactured products.100  The Supreme 
Court held that such coercive package licensing constituted 
patent misuse.101  By requiring royalty payments on products 
that did not incorporate any of the teachings of the patent, the 
agreement impermissibly allowed the patent holder to extend 
the scope of the patent beyond the invention specified in the 
patent. 102  In other words, the patent holder was using its 
patent to get a return on a product beyond what the patent 
holder had invented. 
A finding of patent misuse has serious implications for a 
patent holder.  If a patent holder is found to have engaged in 
misuse, the patent is unenforceable until the misuse ends and 
the effects of the behavior have dissipated.103  Until the effects 
have dissipated, the patent cannot be enforced against any 
                                                          
 97. See 6 CHISUM, supra note 6, § 19.04[3], at 451-534 (describing classic 
acts of misuse). 
 98.  395 U.S. 100 (1969).  
 99. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 104, 
133-34 (1969). 
 100. Id. at 134. 
 101. Id. at 139–40. 
 102. See id. at 135-36; 6 CHISUM, supra note 6, § 19.04[3][c], at 467-72 
(discussing coercive package licenses). 
 103. See, e.g., C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998) (“Patent misuse arises in equity, and a holding of misuse renders 
the patent unenforceable until the misuse is purged; it does not, of itself, 
invalidate the patent.”); 6 CHISUM, supra note 6, § 19.04, at 427. 
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infringer, not just the one who brought the claim of misuse.104 
The danger of a charge of patent misuse is amplified by the 
relaxed standing rules of the doctrine, which date back to a 
series of Supreme Court decisions in the 1940s.105  Under the 
patent misuse doctrine, patent misuse can be raised as a 
defense to infringement even if the defendant is not the one 
who has suffered damage from the alleged misuse.106  As a 
result, many parties may have standing to raise a claim of 
patent misuse, a far wider group, for example, than those who 
would have standing to raise antitrust violations as a 
defense.107 
The patent misuse doctrine emerged in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries during the period in which state 
and federal antitrust laws were taking hold.108  Patent misuse 
and antitrust law share an intertwined history and intersect at 
a variety of doctrinal points.109  Despite the intersections, a 
defendant claiming patent misuse need not show a violation of 
the antitrust laws.110 
In addition, not all terms that appear to extend the time or 
scope of the patent grant would constitute misuse.  For 
example, the Supreme Court has noted that although certain 
                                                          
 104. 6 CHISUM, supra note 6, § 19.04, at 427. 
 105. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); Mercoid 
Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665-66 (1944); Recent 
Decisions, Trade Regulation – Attempted Partial Monopoly of Unpatented 
Product as Defense to Suit for Direct Infringement, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 882, 884 
(1942). 
 106. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse 
Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1599, 1610 (1990).  See also Note, Is the Patent 
Misuse Doctrine Obsolete? 110 HARV. L. REV. 1922, 1939 (1997) (arguing that 
the more lenient standing requirement should be kept to maintain increased 
judicial scrutiny of patents). 
 107. See, e.g., Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 728-29 (1977) (holding 
that only a direct purchaser, not others in the chain of manufacture and 
distribution, may sue for antitrust damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act); 
Duplan Corp. v. Deering Miliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648, 699 (D.C.S.C. 1977) 
(finding a misuse violation but not an antitrust violation because infringers 
were not damaged by the patent holder’s improper actions); see generally 
Albert R. Henry, Limitations Inherent in the Grant of Letters Patent, 27 
CORNELL L. Q. 214, 235-36 (1942). 
 108. See Feldman, supra note 7, at 403. 
 109. For a general description of the development of patent misuse doctrine 
and its intersection with antitrust doctrines, see id. at 402-31. 
 110. See, e.g., Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 494; see also Va. Panel Corp. v. Mac 
Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 872 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting that a violation of the 
antitrust laws requires “more exacting proof than suffices to demonstrate 
patent misuse”). 
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extended payment agreements would bring a return beyond the 
time of the grant, such arrangements would not constitute 
patent misuse if they were reasonable business arrangements 
entered into for the convenience of both parties.111  The line for 
establishing whether behavior that appears to stretch the 
temporal or substantive boundaries of the grant constitutes 
misuse is unclear, however, and such questions presumably 
would fall within a general analysis of what constitutes patent 
misuse. 
Over the last decade, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit has the doctrine of patent misuse, adding 
elements and tests that mirror the federal antitrust laws.112  
For example, the Federal Circuit has expanded the definition of 
patent misuse by adding the requirement that the improper 
extension of the time or scope of the patent must be “with 
anticompetitive effect.”113  In addition, the Federal Circuit has 
established that courts should use antitrust law’s rule of reason 
test to determine whether a particular behavior constitutes 
patent misuse.114  Thus, the Federal Circuit would test patent 
misuse in general, and open source biotechnology licenses in 
particular, by looking for anticompetitive effects under the 
antitrust rule of reason. 
The classic treatise on antitrust describes the rule of 
reason as requiring a series of steps.115 First, the plaintiff has 
the initial burden of showing that the behavior restrains 
competition in a specific market.  Second, if the plaintiff meets 
this initial burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to show 
that its behavior serves legitimate objectives.  Third, if the 
defendant meets that burden, the plaintiff may show that the 
defendant could meet its objective using less restrictive 
                                                          
 111. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 136-
37 (1969). 
 112. See Feldman, supra note 7, at 425-31; see also Robert J. Hoerner, The 
Decline (And Fall?) of the Patent Misuse Doctrine in the Federal Circuit, 69 
ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 672–673 (2002); Patricia A. Martone & Richard M. 
Feustel, Jr., The Patent Misuse Defense – Does it Still Have Vitality?, in 
INTELL. PROP. ANTITRUST 217, 250 (2002). 
 113. See Feldman, supra note 7, at 426; Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, 
Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Va. Panel, 133 F.3d at 869; C.R. Bard, 
Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998); B. Braun Med., Inc. 
v. Abbott Labs, 124 F.3d  1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 114. See supra note 113; see also Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 
F.2d 995, 1001-02 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms., Inc., 228 F. 
Supp. 2d 467 (D. Del. 2002) (applying the Federal Circuit test). 
 115. Feldman, supra note 7, at 422 n.113. 
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alternatives.  And finally, the court must weigh the harms and 
benefits of the restraint with the plaintiff bearing the burden to 
show that the restraint is unreasonable on balance.116 
I have argued that the Federal Circuit’s doctrine is 
inconsistent with the relevant legislative and judicial 
precedents, which suggest that patent misuse should be tested 
by reference to patent policy, not antitrust law.117  In addition 
to the dictates of precedent, using antitrust rules to test for 
patent misuse will be inadequate because the policies 
underlying patent misuse are not confined to limiting the types 
of monopoly harms that antitrust law addresses.118  Thus, 
rather than asking whether the effects of the behavior are 
consistent with antitrust policy, courts should ask whether the 
effects of the behavior are consistent with patent policy.119 
B. THE PATENT MISUSE PROBLEM FOR OPEN SOURCE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 
Open source biotechnology projects face the challenge of 
keeping research tools and other inventions available to a 
broad research community even as the technology advances.  
Under ordinary principles of patent law, however, those who 
make novel and nonobvious improvements in the core 
technology would be entitled to apply for patents on their 
improvements.  This assumes, of course, that the advancement 
meets all of the other requirements of patentability, including 
utility, enablement, and patentable subject matter.  If 
innovators patent their improvements, the best way of utilizing 
the technology would then be controlled by multiple parties, 
leading back to the problem of research techniques shrouded in 
overlapping rights.  As an added problem, any one of the 
multiple parties could demand a royalty that places the full 
technique beyond the reach of many who address the problems 
of poor communities. 
Open source biotechnology projects may face less risk from 
subsequent innovators than open source software projects.  
Biotech research tools frequently are protected by patents 
rather than copyrights, and the standard for patentability is 
                                                          
 116. See id. 
 117. Id. at 421. 
 118. Id. at 431. 
 119. For a more comprehensive discussion of the theories outlined below, 
see Feldman, supra note 7, at 431–49. 
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much higher than the standard for copyrightability.120  For 
example, an improvement in a program that fixes a bug might 
meet the standard for copyrightability as a derivative work but 
not the nonobviousness standard for patentability.121  Thus, 
one would expect open source biotechnology projects to face 
fewer people who could claim rights to patentable 
improvements on the technology than open source software 
projects.  Although the pool may be smaller, open source 
biotechnology projects still face the risk that subsequent 
improvers may claim patent rights to improvements.  In 
addition, to the extent that the biotech project includes 
copyrightable elements, the project incurs the same risks as 
traditional open source software. 
Many of the open source biotech licensing agreements are 
designed to avoid this problem by requiring that participants 
agree to ensure that the core technology and any improvements 
remain available on the same open terms as the core 
technology.  For example, the BIOS project requires that 
participants grant back improvements in the core technology 
and make such improvements freely available to others; the 
HapMap project requires that users not file for patents for 
information contained in the data base; and the BioJava license 
requires that any patent license granted for a version of the 
original software be consistent with the full freedom of use 
specified in the license.122  Open source biotech projects, 
                                                          
 120. See Mark A. Lemley & David W. O’Brien, Encouraging Software 
Reuse, 49 STAN. L. REV. 255, 297 (1997) (“Because of the strong rights patent 
law provides, the standards for obtaining a patent are higher than those for 
obtaining a copyright or a trade secret.”). 
 121. Compare A. Samuel Oddi, An Uneasier Case for Copyright than for 
Patent Protection of Computer Programs, 72 NEB. L. REV. 351, 384 (1993) 
(noting that in order to qualify for patent protection, a computer program 
must pass requirements for novelty, utility, and non-obviousness, while 
copyright laws require only minimal originality), and 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 
(1988) (prescribing that the subject of the patent must be novel and 
nonobvious), with Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 
(1991) (holding in cases concerning copyrightability of phonebooks that choices 
as to selection and arrangement, so long as they entail a minimal degree of 
creativity, are sufficiently original that Congress may protect such 
compilations through the copyright laws); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine 
Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951) (holding that copyright protection 
necessitates no large measure of novelty), and Philip Abromats, Nondisclosure 
of Preexisting Works in Software Copyright Registrations: Inequitable Conduct 
in Need of a  Remedy, 32 JURIMETRICS J. 571, 574 (1992) (noting that in 
copyright, the originality standard for derivative work is typically expressed 
as simply requiring more than trivial additions). 
 122. See, e.g., BIOS Rockefeller Application, supra note 18; HAPMAP 
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however, would not necessarily have to adopt this form of 
licensing.  For example, Maurer, Rai, and Sali’s Tropical 
Disease Initiative does not envision that the project would file 
for patents or restrict others in their ability to file for 
patents.123 
Open source biotechnology licenses may implicate the 
patent misuse prohibition against extending the scope of the 
patent to cover things beyond what the patent holder invented.  
For example, when an open source license requires that any 
improvements must remain freely available to others, the 
patent holder is using the power of the patent granted on its 
tool technology to reach an improvement, something not 
contained in the original patent.  Similarly, when the project 
requires that users give the project a license to any 
improvements, the patent holder again is using its patent 
rights on the core technology to affect the disposition of 
innovations not contained in the original patent. 
The open source licensing scheme does not escape patent 
misuse problems if the improvement is not itself independently 
patentable.  A patent holder can commit patent misuse by 
reaching beyond its patent to unpatented technology as well as 
patented technology.124  The core question is whether the 
patent holder has reached beyond what it invented. 
An open source approach in which users agree not to file 
for patents on any information in the database would present 
an interesting twist.  If the information contained in the 
database is completely in the public domain- that is, not subject 
to patent protection- the group may avoid the problem of 
misuse.  There can be no patent misuse if the group does not 
hold patent rights. 
If, however, the group does hold patent rights and those 
patent rights form part of the basis for the contractual 
arrangement, patent misuse may be implicated.  To the extent 
that a patent holder uses its rights to restrict the disposition of 
inventions not covered by the grant, the patent holder may be 
                                                          
PROJECT, supra note 1; Open Bioinformatics Foundation, BioJava Project, 
supra note 60. 
 123. See Maurer, supra note 1, at 34. 
 124. Cf. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); 1 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST 
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 3.3b1(A), at 3-12 
(Supp. 2003) (describing a classic patent misuse behavior in which a patent 
holder requires that those who would license the patent also purchase a 
separate, unpatented product). 
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engaging in behavior that extends the scope of the patent grant 
and thereby may be subject to a claim of misuse. 
The open source arrangements that may implicate the 
patent misuse doctrine fall into two general categories. The 
first category includes agreements to grant the original patent 
holder the right to use and sublicense any improvements to the 
patented technology.  The second category includes restrictions 
on the terms on which the inventor of the improvement may 
protect its invention.  Such restrictions may take the form of 
dictating the terms upon which the improvement may be 
licensed or directing that the improvement may not be 
patented. 
In theory, licenses could cover not just improvements in 
the core research technology, but also products invented using 
the research technology.  For example, one could imagine an 
open source project grounded on the following principles: “We 
will provide our research tools for you to develop a product that 
can improve crop sustainability in underserved nations.  If you 
invent such a product, however, you must make it freely 
available to others.”  After all, what good would it do if the 
project participants subsequently patented their discoveries, 
making them available only to large agribiotech companies at 
high prices?  Such an arrangement would contemplate that 
those granted free and open access to the research tools would 
be required to grant free and open access to the things invented 
with those tools. 
Most open source projects have tried to steer clear of such 
an expansive licensing arrangement, limiting their reach to 
improvements made on the core research technology rather 
than products invented using the technology.  Nevertheless, the 
implications are similar for both.  In assigning rights to 
inventions, the Patent Act does not distinguish between 
inventions that are improvements on a prior invention and new 
inventions.125  In both approaches, the patent holder is using 
patent rights to affect the disposition of technology not within 
                                                          
 125. See Gerald Sobel, The Antitrust Interface with Patents and Innovation: 
Acquisition of Patents, Improvement Patents and Grant-Backs, Non-Use, 
Fraud on the Patent Office, Development of New Products and Joint Research, 
53 ANTITRUST L.J. 681, 689 (1985); see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash 
Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 368-69 (1938) (noting that most inventions 
represent improvements on some existing technology); see also Chiron Corp. v. 
Genentech, Inc. 268 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1155 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (noting that 
“[p]atents are and should be granted to later inventors upon unobvious 
improvements”). 
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the patent.  Therefore, both approaches suggest that the patent 
holder is expanding the scope of the patent beyond its grants.  
The question is whether the courts should consider such an 
expansion improper. 
One might wonder why the issue of patent misuse has not 
arisen in the context of open source software.  Software is 
eligible for patent protection, and thus, patent software subject 
to open source licenses could be subject to a charge of patent 
misuse.126 
Many of the intellectual property rights issues in open 
source software have emerged as copyright rather than patent 
issues.127  Although software can receive both copyright and 
patent protection, copyright protection begins the moment the 
software is fixed in a tangible medium of expression, while 
patent protection requires a long and difficult application 
process.  Thus, if inventors of open source software do not 
patent their works, there can be no charge of patent misuse. 
In recent years, however, copyright has developed its own 
doctrine of misuse.  The doctrine is a relatively new addition to 
the copyright landscape. No circuit court expressly recognized 
the defense of copyright misuse until 1990 when the Fourth 
Circuit decided Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds.128  The 
court in Lasercomb found that a ninety-nine year noncompete 
clause constituted copyright misuse in part because the clause 
                                                          
 126. See Nadan, supra note 66, at 367-68 (noting that even if open source 
licenses are binding, the copyleft provisions may not be enforceable in light of 
the intellectual property misuse concepts including patent misuse); see also 
Lawrence D. Graham & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., Economically Efficient 
Treatment of Computer Software: Reverse Engineering, Protection, and 
Disclosure, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 61, 93-94 (1996) (describing 
the test for patentability of software). 
 127. See e.g., Nadan, supra note 66, at 369-71 (discussing copyright 
concerns related to the GPL); Shawn W. Potter, Opening Up to Open Source, 6 
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 24, ¶¶ 56-74 (Spring 2000) (detailing copyright concerns related to 
open source software), at. http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/v6i5/article3.html.  
 128. 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990); see David Scher, The Viability of the 
Copyright Misuse Defense, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 89, 91 (2000) (“Although the 
misuse defense was discussed in the context of a copyright action in dictum as 
early as 1948, the first court to employ the misuse defense to actually render a 
copyright unenforceable was the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 
1990.”); G. Gervaise Davise, III, The Rapidly Growing Defense of Copyright 
Misuse and Efforts to Establish Trademark Misuse, in INTELL. PROP. 
ANTITRUST 639, 645 (PLI Intellectual Property Course Handbook Series No. 
G-566, 1999); Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Copyright Misuse and the Limits of the 
Intellectual Property Monopoly, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 4 (1998) (“Until 1990, 
no federal circuit court and only one federal district court accepted the 
copyright misuse defense . . . .”). 
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would have denied the public the creative abilities of the 
licensee and its staff for an excessive period of time.129 
Lasercomb, considered the leading case on copyright 
misuse, established a broad definition of copyright misuse, 
similar to the equitable doctrine of unclean hands.130  
Lasercomb’s definition of copyright misuse is generally 
considered more expansive than the definition of patent 
misuse, and there have been some efforts to narrow 
Lasercomb’s broad definition.131  One might have expected that 
challenges to the open source licensing structure would include 
a charge of copyright misuse.132 
The simplest answer is that there have been few cases 
testing the validity of the licensing restrictions in the open 
source software movement.133  As more cases emerge, open 
source software licenses may indeed be challenged as patent or 
copyright misuse. 
III. ANALOGIES TO TRADITIONAL PATENT LICENSING 
As described above, many of the arrangements used in 
open source biotechnology projects could be characterized as 
                                                          
 129. See Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978. 
 130. See Davise, supra note 128, at 645; Ilan Charnelle, The Justification 
and Scope of the Copyright Misuse Doctrine and its Independence of the 
Antitrust Laws, 9 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 167, 179 (2002) (noting that copyright 
defense has its historical roots in the unclean hands defense, not in antitrust); 
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 846 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(“In the absence of any statutory entitlement to a copyright misuse defense, 
however, the defense is solely an equitable doctrine. Any party seeking 
equitable relief must come to the court with ‘clean hands’.”); see also Alcatel 
USA, Inc. v. DGI Technologies, Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 792 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing 
Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 792). 
 131. See Davise, supra note 128, at 645; see also Fellmeth, supra note 128, 
at 27–28 (arguing that in general, the “rule of reason analysis is different 
when applied to copyright misuse insofar as some courts construe 
anticompetitive conduct with respect to copyrights more leniently than with 
respect to patents”). 
 132. See Nadan, supra note 66, at 369 (discussing grantbacks and patent 
misuse in the context of open source software). 
 133. See Dennis M. Kennedy, A Primer on Open Source Licensing Legal 
Issues:  Copyright, Copyleft, and Copyfuture, 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 345, 
368 (2000); Cf. Nadan, supra note 66, at 368 (noting that the courts have yet to 
analyze a copyleft provision for misuse).  In 2004, one American and one 
German case have addressed issues related to enforceability of the GPL.  See 
Computer Associates Int’l v. Quest Software, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 2d 688 (N.D. 
Ill. 2004);  GPL Gains Clout in German Legal Case, CNET NEWS, April 22, 
2004, available at http://news.com.com/2100-7344_3-
5198117.html?part=business2-cnet.   
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attempts to extend the scope of its patent beyond the grant.  
The proper inquiry under such circumstances should be to 
examine the effects of the behavior to determine whether such 
an attempt is impermissible. 
Open source biotechnology arrangements can be analogized 
to three types of arrangements that have appeared in patent 
licensing outside of the open source arena: field of use 
restrictions, grantbacks, and reach-throughs.  All three have 
been alleged, under certain circumstances, to constitute 
misuse.134 
Precedents in these areas are few, and the logic is 
frequently unsatisfying.  In particular, courts often resolve 
these cases by simply declaring that a behavior falls inside or 
outside the patent grant.  Thus, questions are resolved not by 
looking at the extent of the invention and how far the behavior 
reaches, but by concluding that it seems right to allow a patent 
holder to engage in a behavior, so the behavior must surely fall 
within the patent grant.  The following section describes the 
precedents in each of the three areas, exploring analogies to 
open source licensing. 
A. FIELD OF USE RESTRICTIONS 
A field of use restriction places a limit on what licensees 
can do with a patented product.  Limits could include a 
restriction on the type of product that a licensee can make with 
a patented invention.135 For example, in Baldwin-Lima 
                                                          
 134. See HOVENKAMP, ET AL., supra note 124, § 3.3b4, at 3-27 (describing 
grantbacks); Bayer AG v. Housey Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 467 
(D. Del. 2002) (concerning an allegation of patent misuse based on reach-
through royalties); see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Technology Transfer and the 
Genome Project: Problems with Patenting Research Tools, 5 RISK 163, 172 
(1994) (describing reach-through royalties); Principles and Guidelines for 
Recipients of NIH Research Grants and Contracts on Obtaining and 
Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources: Final Notice, 64 Fed. Reg. 
72090, 72091 (Dec. 23, 1999) [hereinafter NIH Guidelines] (describing reach-
through royalties). 
 135. See Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Tatnall Measuring Sys. Co., 169 
F. Supp. 1, 30 (E.D. Pa. 1958) (finding the restriction outside the patent 
grant), aff'd per curiam, 268 F.2d 395 (3d Cir. 1959).  See also Turner Glass 
Corp. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 173 F.2d 49, 53 (7th Cir. 1949) (finding no 
antitrust violation when patentee leased glass-making machine under the 
condition that it could be used only to make certain types of glassware); Barr 
Rubber Prod. Co. v. Sun Rubber Co., 277 F. Supp. 484, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) 
(finding that holder of process patent could license one firm to use the process 
for making hobby horses while denying this mode of use to other licensees), 
aff’d 425 F.2d 1114 (2d Cir. 1970). 
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Hamilton Corp. v. Tatnall Measuring Systems Co.,136 the patent 
holder had invented a gauge to test the amount of stress effects 
on a material.137  A manufacturer could make expendable 
gauges that could be used as a tool to test different materials,  
The gauges also could be manufactured as part of some other 
machine or apparatus for constant monitoring.138  The patent 
holder manufactured gauges for constant monitoring and 
restricted licensees to making expendable gauges.139 
Other limits are a restriction on the type of customers to 
whom a licensee may sell, or a requirement that a licensee 
restrict the uses that its customers can make of the product.140 
For example, in General Talking Pictures v. Western Electric 
Co.,141 licensees were permitted to sell patented amplifier tubes 
only to those who manufactured products for private home use 
but not to those who manufactured equipment for commercial 
theaters.142 
In general, courts have allowed field of use restrictions on 
classes of customers to whom licensees can sell and restrictions 
on the kinds of objects that the patented process may be used to 
produce.143  At times, however, they have been willing to strike 
down such agreements as illegal.144  The reasoning and results 
are far from clear and consistent, and there have been no 
Supreme Court decisions on field of use restrictions since the 
                                                          
 136.  169 F. Supp 1, 30 (E.D. Pa.1958). 
 137. See id. at 28. 
 138. See id.  
 139. Id.  
 140. See Gen. Talking Pictures Co. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938), 
aff’d on reh’g, 305 U.S. 124 (1938). 
 141.  304 U.S. 175 (1938),  aff’d on reh’g, 305 U.S. 124 (1938). 
 142. See Gen. Talking Pictures, 304 U.S. at 180. 
 143. See United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, 670 F.2d 1122, 1133 
(D.C. Cir. 1981); see also 6 CHISUM, supra note 6, § 19.04[3][i], at 507 
(describing how lower courts have upheld use and style restrictions). 
 144. See Studiengesellschaft Kohle, 670 F.2d at 1133.  The 
Studiengesellschaft  Kohle court noted the following: 
Courts have generally followed General Talking Pictures in holding 
legal such field-of-use restraints as a restriction on classes of 
customers to which licensees could sell and a restriction on the kinds 
of objects on which the process could be used. But courts have 
occasionally distinguished General Talking Pictures and held the 
restraint illegal where they perceived that the field-of-use restriction 
was being used to extend the patent into areas not protected by the 
patent monopoly, such as a requirement that a patented strain gauge 
only be sold with the licensee's machines. 
Id. 
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1938 decision in General Talking Pictures.145  Commenting on 
General Talking Pictures, the leading patent treatise notes that 
the Court “seemed to uphold the legality of restricted use 
conditions simply because they reflected a venerable practice 
that had gone unquestioned for many years.”146  In addition, 
the decision has been clouded by later Supreme Court cases 
that could be read to implicitly overrule it.147 
The confusion can be traced to a clash between the notion 
that patent holders should be permitted to organize their 
monopoly in an efficient manner148 and the first sale doctrine, 
which holds that patent holders cannot control the use of a 
patented item once it has been placed in the channels of 
commerce.  According to the first sale doctrine, the first 
authorized sale of a patented article frees it from the patent 
monopoly.149  Patent holders who try to restrain the use of the 
patented article after the first authorized sale may be 
exceeding the scope of the patent and are thereby subject to a 
charge of misuse.150 
The first sale doctrine traces its heritage to real property 
doctrines as well as intellectual property doctrines.  It is 
grounded in theories of free alienability of chattel as well as the 
view that individuals expect to be able to use the items they 
purchase in any manner.151 
In 1938, the Supreme Court faced a direct clash of the two 
                                                          
 145. In the Supreme Court case of Automatic Radio Manufacturing Co. v. 
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950), the parties challenged a 
provision requiring that a licensee attach a notice to a product restricting its 
use to private, educational, and non-commercial uses.  See id. at 834-35.   The 
Supreme Court declined to address the question, however, ruling that the 
issue was not properly before the Court.  See id. at 835-36. 
 146. 6 CHISUM, supra note 6, § 19.04[3][i], at 507. 
 147. See id. § 19.04[3][i], at 510 (discussing General Talking Pictures and 
its continued viability in the lower courts even though later Supreme Court 
cases such as United States v. Univis Lens, 316 U.S. 241 (1942), have 
implicitly overruled portions of the case by reaffirming the first sale doctrine 
in the area of price-fixing). 
 148. See Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 712, 
713 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (“Ciba’s licensing practices may, as a practical matter, 
have the effect of restricting the market . . . .  This effect, however, is a direct 
result of the HCT monopoly created by the 645 patent.”). 
 149. See 6 CHISUM, supra note 6, § 19.04[3][h], at 502. 
 150. See id. § 19.04[3][i], at 505. 
 151. See Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89 (1882); Patent Use 
Restrictions, 75 HARV. L. REV. 602, 606 (describing the first sale doctrine as 
applied in American Cotton-Tie and noting that the Court spoke in terms of 
property law). 
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issues in the case of General Talking Pictures152  In General 
Talking Pictures, the patent holder held a patent on amplifier 
tubes.153  Licensees were given the right to make the tubes, but 
were only allowed to sell them for use in equipment designed 
for homes. They were not given the right to sell them for use in 
commercial movie house equipment.154  The Supreme Court 
upheld the restrictions in a decision which it subsequently 
reaffirmed with an additional opinion on rehearing.155 
The facts presented two potential types of restrictions on 
use after sale.  First, the patent holder arguably was 
restraining the licensee’s use after proper purchase by telling 
licensees that they could sell the tubes only to certain 
customers.  The Supreme Court, however, declared that the 
patent grant embraces this type of restriction with no 
discussion beyond the fact that the practice is an old one that 
has never been questioned.156 
Second, the licensing arrangement could be described as 
limiting what the secondary buyers of the tubes could do after 
purchasing them from the licensed manufacturer.  In 
particular, secondary purchasers were effectively restricted to 
using the particular tubes in home rather than commercial 
equipment.  Such a limit would restrict what a purchaser could 
do once an item has been purchased in the ordinary channels of 
commerce, in contravention of the first sale doctrine. 
The Court’s language suggested that restrictions on what 
the secondary purchaser does might have been problematic, but 
that such was not the issue in this case.  From the Court’s 
perspective, the manufactured item had not passed 
appropriately into the stream of commerce because its 
manufacture was not permitted in the first place.157  The court 
                                                          
 152. Gen. Talking Pictures Co. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938), aff’d on 
reh’g, 305 U.S. 124 (1938). 
 153. See Gen. Talking Pictures, 304 U.S. at 176. 
 154. See id. at 180. 
 155. See Gen. Talking Pictures, 305 U.S. at 125-26.  The rehearing opinion 
appears to be crafted to avoid the question of whether later purchasers can be 
restricted by a notice affixed to the product.  See id. at 127 (“Nor have we 
occasions to consider the effect of a ‘licensee’s notice’ which purports to restrict 
the use of articles lawfully sold.”). 
 156. See id. at 127.  The original decision offered no more discussion than 
the rehearing.  See Gen. Talking Pictures, 304 U.S. at 181 (stating simply that 
“[t]here is no attempt on the part of the patent owner to extend the scope of 
the monopoly beyond that contemplated by the patent statute”). 
 157. See Gen. Talking Pictures, 304 U.S. at 180–81; Gen. Talking Pictures, 
305 U.S. at 127. 
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reasoned that because the original licensee sold the product 
outside the scope of the license, the effect was the same as if no 
license whatsoever had been granted to the secondary buyer.158  
Questions about restrictions on the secondary buyer simply 
didn’t apply because the secondary buyer had no right to the 
product at all. 
In short, the court avoided application of the first sale 
doctrine and held that a patent holder could restrict licensees 
to manufacturing for a particular field of use.  Little logic, 
however, was provided for the decision.  In addition, although 
lower courts generally have followed General Talking Pictures, 
some scholars have questioned its vitality given later Supreme 
Court cases that implicitly overrule parts of the case by 
reaffirming the first sale doctrine in the context of price-
fixing.159 
One lower court, however, distinguished General Talking 
Pictures by finding a distinction between a patented machine 
and patented components. 160  In United States v. Consolidated 
Car-Heating,161 the patent holder had invented a metal alloy.162  
The patent holder prevented licensees from using the alloy to 
manufacture anything other than dental restorations, such as 
crowns and dentures.163 The court found patent misuse, 
essentially concluding that while a patent holder may restrict 
the use its product is sold for under General Talking Pictures, a 
patent holder cannot make that restriction when the product 
will be used as a component in manufacturing something 
else.164  Again, the court provided little explanation for the 
decision. 
Although the distinction may have been an attempt to 
salvage the first sale doctrine, it makes little sense and does 
not fit easily within the facts of the two cases.  In General 
                                                          
 158. See Gen. Talking Pictures, 305 U.S. at 127. 
 159. See 6 CHISUM, supra  note 6, § 19.04[3][i], at 510 (questioning the 
viability of General Talking Pictures in light of cases such as United States v. 
Univis Lens, 316 U.S. 241 (1942)). 
 160. See United States v. Consol. Car-Heating Co., 87 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 20, 
21–23 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); 6 CHISUM. supra note 6, § 19.04[3][i], at 511 (describing 
United States v. Consolidated Car-Heating and noting that to avoid General 
Talking Pictures, the court drew a rather fine distinction between patented 
machines and patented components and materials).  
 161.  Consol. Car-Heating Co., 87 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) at 20. 
 162. Id. at 21. 
 163. Id. at 22-23. 
 164. See id. at 23.  
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Talking Pictures, the licensee sold tubes for inclusion in 
equipment.  From a broad perspective, this could be considered 
selling a component to be used in furthering manufacturing. 
In 2004, the Federal Circuit waded into the question of 
field of use restrictions in the case of Monsanto v. McFarling.165  
The Monsanto case concerned Monsanto’s patented soybeans 
seeds and the company’s single use restriction.166  Monsanto’s 
soybean seeds have been modified by inserting a gene sequence 
that makes the resulting plants immune from Monsanto’s 
powerful Roundup herbicide.167  Monsanto requires that seed 
companies who produce Monsanto’s seeds must execute license 
agreements with farmers in which the farmers agree not to 
replant any seeds harvested from the soybean plants.168  In 
other words, the farmers may purchase seeds, use the seeds to 
grow soybean plants, and sell the seeds from the soybean 
plants for food, but not use the seeds from the soybean plants 
for replanting.  Monsanto brought an infringement suit against 
a farmer who saved 1,500 bushels of soybean seeds from his 
crop, enough to plant 1,500 acres the following year.169 
Although the Federal Circuit upheld the single use 
restriction, it found that the restriction could not be 
characterized as a valid field of use restriction.170  The court 
reasoned that the restriction did not place limitations on the 
use of the product purchased under the patent, which could 
have been valid.171  Rather, the agreement placed restrictions 
on the use of the goods made with the licensed product, which 
extended beyond the patent grant.172  In other words, Monsanto 
sold first generation seeds that could be used to grow soybean 
plants that make other seeds.  Placing restrictions on what 
could be done with the second generation seeds that had been 
produced by the patented product would not be legitimate. 
Although the restriction did not constitute a legitimate 
field of use limitation, the court reasoned that the facts of the 
case presented a unique set of circumstances that justified the 
restrictions.  Given that the second-generation seeds contain 
                                                          
 165. 363 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 166. See id. 
 167. See id. at 1338. 
 168. Id. at 1339. 
 169. See id. at 1339-40. 
 170. See id. at 1342-43. 
 171. See Monsanto v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  
 172. See id. 
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Monsanto’s patented genetic sequence, the court found that 
Monsanto held rights in the second-generation seeds as well.173 
Thus, given that we must presume that Monsanto’s ‘435 patent reads 
on the first-generation seeds, it also reads on the second-generation 
seeds.  Because the ‘435 patent would read on all generations of 
soybeans produced, we hold that the restrictions in the Technology 
Agreement prohibiting the replanting of the second generation of 
ROUNDUP READY® soybeans do not extend Monsanto’s rights 
under the patent statute.174 
The court left open, however, what it saw as the more 
difficult question of restrictions on the use of goods that are 
made by the patented technology but do not incorporate it.175 
Monsanto’s facts do present an interesting variation in that 
most technology does not replicate itself in the way that living 
organisms do.  Technology generally is used as a tool to make 
something else or as a component in making something else but 
not to make a new version of itself, except perhaps in the case 
of certain software applications in which code replicates itself.  
In the Monsanto case, one can think of the creation of the 
second generation seeds as the creation of a new product.  
Perhaps restrictions can be applied to creation of a new 
product, even if not to later sales. 
Nevertheless, the facts of Monsanto can be analogized to 
other, more common cases.  The second generation seeds 
contained Monsanto’s patented genetic sequence in the same 
way that any time a patented product serves as a component; 
the second product will contain the first.  For example, the 
dentures mentioned in Consolidated Car-Heating contained the 
patented dental alloy.  The court’s decision, therefore, could 
suggest that any restriction on downstream products that 
contain the patented product as a component will be 
permissible, regardless of the first sale doctrine, because the 
patent holder’s rights on making, using, and selling its product 
would be implicated by the formation of a new product that 
contains a patented element.  Such an approach would 
significantly weaken the first sale doctrine.176 
                                                          
 173. See id. at 1343. 
 174. Id.  
 175. See id. (“Our case law has not addressed in general terms the status of 
such restrictions placed on goods made by, yet not incorporating, the licensed 
good under the patent misuse doctrine.  However, the Technology Agreement 
presents a unique set of facts . . . .”). 
 176. The Monsanto opinion follows in the footsteps of an earlier Federal 
Circuit decision that substantially weakens the first sale doctrine.  
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Thus, Monsanto echoes the distinction suggested in 
Consolidated Car-Heating but with the opposite result.  
Monsanto would allow restrictions on downstream purchasers 
and producers if the downstream products contain some 
component that is patented.  The court leaves open the 
question of downstream products made with the patented 
technology but not containing it. 
One could argue that open source licenses are analogous to 
field of use agreements.  An open source license restricts the 
use of the patented invention to a particular market, which is 
the open source market.  From this perspective, the patent 
holder requires, for example, that its patented tool can only be 
used to manufacture one type of product, and that type of 
product is open source.  Similarly, the patent holder requires 
that its invention may only be used as a component of one type 
of product.  Again, that type of product would be an open source 
product. 
Under a similar analysis, one could describe open source 
agreements as limiting the type of customer to whom a licensee 
can sell.  That customer would be one who operates within an 
open source environment.  As a variant of this, one could 
analyze the agreement as requiring licensees to impose 
restrictions on the types of uses customers can make of the 
products made with the patented technology. 
If the Monsanto approach were applied to open source 
biotechnology, licensing restrictions relating to products that 
contain the patented technology could escape the first sale 
doctrine’s limitation on field of use restrictions.  For example, 
requirements that downstream versions of the software remain 
available on open terms would be acceptable given that the 
original software is a component of the downstream product.177  
The question of whether restrictions on goods made with the 
open source tool but not incorporating the tool would be 
acceptable remains unresolved after Monsanto. 
In summary, field of use restrictions are frequently upheld, 
                                                          
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 177. Some have suggested that distinctions among different field of use 
restrictions are irrelevant, although they do not necessarily agree on the 
results of eliminating those distinctions.  Compare Patent Use Restrictions, 
supra note 151 (arguing for greater scrutiny of all field of use restrictions on 
the grounds that they are basically anticompetitive), with Mallinckrodt, 976 
F.2d at 705 (finding the distinction between restricting the use of first 
purchasers and second purchasers to be formalistic line-drawing in a case in 
which the licensing restrictions were upheld). 
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although the cases lack a unifying logic.  Courts tend to rely on 
artificial distinctions between field of use restrictions that fall 
within the grant of the patent and those that fall outside the 
grant.  As the first sale doctrine fades in Federal Circuit 
jurisprudence, the legality of a field of use restriction for a 
patented technology should focus more strongly on the general 
test for patent misuse, examining the effects of the behavior.  
The Federal Circuit may have had a similar approach in mind 
in Mallinckrodt Inc. v. Mediapart178 when it suggested that a 
first sale doctrine issue could be cast in terms of general patent 
misuse inquiry which would then be tested either as a per se 
violation or under the rule of reason.179  Such an approach 
could mark the death knell for the first use doctrine, although 
lessons learned from the doctrine could be addressed in the 
context of the general patent misuse test.  The question of 
whether an open source license analogized to a field of use 
restriction is permissible would then be tested either by asking 
whether the effects of the behavior are inconsistent with patent 
policy or by following the Federal Circuit’s current approach of 
testing whether the effects of the behavior are inconsistent 
with the antitrust rule of reason. 
B. GRANTBACKS 
Some open source licensing arrangements can be 
analogized to grantback provisions.  Grantback clauses require 
the licensee to give the patent holder rights in products that 
the licensee develops.180  Grantbacks may include only 
improvements to technology that falls within the scope of the 
original patent claims or may extend to all inventions within 
the general subject matter of the patent.181 
Some grantbacks are exclusive, thereby giving the patent 
holder sole rights to any further invention. 182  The licensee who 
invented the improvement may or may not have permission to 
use the improvement as well, and that permission may or may 
                                                          
 178. 976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 179. See id. at 706-09. 
 180. See 6 CHISUM, supra note 6, § 19.04[3][j]; HOVENKAMP, ET AL., supra 
note 124, § 3.3b4, at 3-27. 
 181. See 6 CHISUM, supra note 6, § 19.04[3][j], at 520. 
 182. Some exclusive grantbacks allow the second inventor to retain the 
rights to use the improvement.  See HOVENKAMP, ET AL., supra note 124, § 
3.3b4, at 3-28–29 (describing different forms of exclusivity in grantback 
agreements). 
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not require additional royalties.183  In contrast, some 
grantbacks are nonexclusive licenses, in which the original 
patent holder presumably will be one of many licensees who 
have permission to use the improvement.184  Again, the licensee 
who invented the improvement may or may not be required to 
pay additional royalties to use the invention. 
Grantbacks in more limited form generally have been 
upheld against claims of misuse.185  These provisions have been 
structured primarily in two ways.  First, the licensee grants the 
original patent holder a royalty-free license to use the 
improvement.  In the alternative, the licensee assigns the 
rights to the improvement back to the original patent holder 
but reserves right to use the improvements at no additional 
royalty.186 
For example, in 1947, the Supreme Court considered a 
patent misuse challenge to a clause requiring that a licensee 
assign all improvements back to the patent holder, but 
granting the licensee the right to use the improvements.187  In 
this case, Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith 
Co.,188 the court held that the agreement extended beyond the 
scope of the basic term of the patent but declined to find 
misuse.189  The court rejected the argument that the clause 
reduced the downstream inventor’s incentive to innovate, 
reasoning that the licensee’s right to use the invention without 
additional royalty created sufficient incentive for innovation.190  
The court did note, however, that grantbacks could not be used 
                                                          
 183. See Shelia J. McCartney, Licensing Alternatives to Limit Antitrust and 
Misuse Exposure, 7 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 10, 13 (1995); see also Transparent-
Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 646 (1947) (holding 
that the licensee has the right to use the improvement at no additional 
royalty). 
 184. See HOVENKAMP, ET AL., supra note 124, § 3.3b4, at 3-28–29 
(describing different forms of exclusivity in grantback agreements). 
 185. See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 444 F.Supp. 648, 699-
700, (D.S.C. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 594 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1979); 
see also 6 CHISUM, supra note 6, § 19.04[3][j], at 525-26 (noting that limited 
forms of grantbacks have been held not to constitute misuse); McCartney, 
supra note 183, at 14 (1995) (concluding that although more limited forms of 
grantbacks are unlikely to constitute misuse, some courts have found misuse 
where the scope of the grantback is broader than the scope of the original 
license). 
 186. See 6 CHISUM, supra note 6, § 19.01[3][j]. 
 187. See Transparent-Wrap, 329 U.S. at 637. 
 188.  329 U.S. 637, 646 (1947).  
 189. Transparent-Wrap, 329 U.S. at 645-46. 
 190. Id. at 646. 
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to suppress competition in violation of the antitrust laws.191 
Subsequent to Transparent-Wrap, one lower court has 
suggested that in determining whether a grantback clause 
constitutes misuse, one should examine whether the clause 
adversely affects the licensee’s incentive to engage in research 
and development.192  In examining a misuse claim, the district 
court in International Nickel Co. v. Ford Motor Co.193 noted 
that grantback provisions that “tend to stifle research are 
antagonistic to the underlying policies of the patent laws.”194 
In applying this test, however, the International Nickel 
court suggested that the licensee must provide specific evidence 
that the clause actually stifled innovation, rather than merely 
showing that the terms have the potential to stifle innovation.  
For example, the court rejected the claim of misuse on the 
grounds that considerable research had been conducted by 
licensees.  As a result, the court believed that “any claim that 
absent the agreement, there would have been greater research 
was mere conjecture.”195 
Similarly, in Hull v. Brunswick,196 the Tenth Circuit 
upheld a requirement that a licensee pay royalties on its 
improvements.197  Given that no royalties were ever collected 
on improvements, the court dismissed as merely hypothetical 
the charge that the provision inhibited innovation.198  The court 
noted in particular that the licensee never established any 
instances in which innovation was actually inhibited.199 
If potential impact on innovation were relevant, one would 
have expected the Hull court to consider the deterrent effect of 
the clause on the decision to innovate.  At the very least, in the 
first instance of an innovation, the innovator presumably would 
not know that the clause would not be enforced.  Even after the 
patent holder has neglected to collect royalties on 
improvements, a potential innovator still faces the risk that if 
                                                          
 191. See id. at 646-47.  Several lower court decisions in antitrust suits have 
applied Transparent-Wrap to condemn grantbacks used to suppress 
competition.  See 6 CHISUM, supra note 6, § 19.04[3][j], at 520-26. 
 192. See Int’l Nickel v. Ford Motor Co., 166 F.Supp. 551, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 
1958); Sobel, supra note 125, at 690-91. 
 193.  166 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).  
 194. International Nickel, 166 F. Supp. at 565. 
 195. Id. at 566. 
 196.  704 F.2d 1195 (10th Cir. 1983). 
 197. Hull v. Brunswick Corp., 704 F.2d 1195, 1202 (10th Cir. 1983). 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
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an improvement were sufficiently substantial, the patent 
holder might be moved to enforce its right to royalties, a risk 
that at least has the potential to affect the decision to innovate. 
Despite leniency on the issue of actual verses potential 
incentive to innovate, some courts and commentators have 
questioned the validity of more expansive grantbacks.  For 
example, one court held in 1977 that a grantback constitutes 
misuse when the licensee is required to grant back 
improvements related to technology beyond the original 
innovation.200  The court described the patented innovation as 
relating to a mechanism for arresting the twist of a particular 
textile within a heating medium.201  A licensing provision 
requiring that licensees grant back improvements related to 
any technology, not just that related to the twisting within a 
heating mechanism, reached too broadly and constituted patent 
misuse.202 
Other authorities have suggested that grantbacks may be 
problematic if they are exclusive rather than nonexclusive.203  
While nonexclusive grantbacks allow the market for the 
improvement to thrive, exclusive grantbacks are more likely to 
restrict competition relating to the improvement.204 
Grantback provisions in open source biotechnology may be 
structured as a nonexclusive grant of rights on improvements 
in the core technology back to the open source project.205  This 
form of grantback follows the outlines of the grantbacks that 
                                                          
 200. See Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648, 699-700 
(D.S.C. 1977), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 549 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1979); see 
also Transitron Elec. Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 487 F. Supp. 885, 893, 904 
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690-91. 
 201. See Duplan, 444 F. Supp. at 699-700. 
 202. See id. at 700. 
 203. See HOVENKAMP, ET AL., supra note 124, § 3.3b4, at 3-27-28; U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE 
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 5.6 (1995) [hereinafter FTC/DOJ 
GUIDELINES]; NIH Guidelines, supra note 134. 
 204. See HOVENKAMP, JANIS, & LEMLEY, supra note 124, § 3.3b4, at A3-28; 
FTC/DOJ Guidelines, supra note 203; NIH Guidelines, supra note 134. 
 205. See, e.g., Janet Hope, Open Source Biotechnology: My View on Open 
Source and Pharmaceutical Companies, at 
http://rsss.anu.edu.au/~janeth/OSBiotech.html; (last visited July 14, 2004); see 
also Salleh, supra note 1, (noting that licensees will agree to share 
improvements in the core technology). 
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generally have been approved by courts and agencies.206  Open 
source provisions that require an exclusive grant of rights back 
to the group or that extend to products invented using the 
patented technology would be more troubling. 
Open source licensing, however, may involve 
considerations beyond those of ordinary grantbacks.  Under 
ordinary circumstances, nonexclusive grantbacks are 
acceptable in part because although the improver must grant 
rights to the original patent holder, the improver is also free to 
grant rights to others.  This freedom gives the improver room to 
capitalize on the invention, at least with customers other than 
the original patent holder.  The ability to capitalize in this 
matter may allay concerns that the grantback could inhibit the 
licensee’s incentive to create improvements.  The licensee is 
always free to garner a return from customers other than the 
original patent holder. 
Such is not the case with open source licensing.  In much 
open source licensing, the licensee is required not only to grant 
nonexclusive rights to the open source group, but also to license 
others on the same open terms as the original license.  Thus, 
the improver may be unable to garner a return in any market.  
Who would pay the improver when the improvement is 
available for free from the open source project?  This provision 
could, in theory, effect incentives to improve the core 
technology. As with field of use restrictions, however, the 
relevant analysis for any particular form of grantback would 
turn on whether the effects of the behavior are inconsistent 
with patent policy or the antitrust rule of reason. 
C. REACH-THROUGH PROVISIONS 
Reach-through provisions have appeared most frequently 
in the context of reach-through royalties on biotechnology 
research tools.207  Under a reach-through royalty, payments for 
                                                          
 206. See FTC/DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 203, § 5.6; see 6 CHISUM, supra 
note 6, § 19.04[3][j], at 525-26 (noting that courts generally have upheld 
limited forms of grantbacks). 
 207. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 134, at 172 (describing reach-through 
royalties on sales of products that are developed in part through use of biotech 
research tools); see Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 467, 471 
(D. Del. 2002) (upholding a reach-through royalty on biotech research despite 
allegations of patent misuse); see also NIH Guidelines, supra note 134, at 
72,093 (expressing disapproval of reach-through royalties on biotech research 
tools); see also John H. Barton, Research-Tool Patents: Issues for Health in the 
Developing World, 80 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 121 (2002) (describing ways 
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use of a patented technology are measured in relation to 
products created through a process involving the technology.208  
For example, if the patented technology is a tool for isolating a 
particular protein, a reach-through royalty might be structured 
such that the licensee pays royalties based on a percentage of 
sales from any drugs later developed to interact with the 
protein.  With a reach-through royalty, one could argue that 
the patent holder is using rights granted in one technology to 
garner a return on an invention not covered in the patent 
grant.209 
A similar issue arises with reach-through claims.  With 
reach-through claims, a broad enabling technology is patented 
with claims drafted to cover things produced using that 
technology.  The Federal Circuit recently rejected claims 
drafted as reach-throughs.210 
The legal status of reach-through royalties is unclear.  
Only one case has addressed whether a reach-through royalty 
constitutes patent misuse, and the court found no misuse.211  In 
contrast, the National Institutes of Health guidelines strongly 
discourage the use of reach-through royalties.212  In addition, 
scholars have argued that reach-through royalties are 
detrimental to the patent system because of the royalty 
stacking effects and the tendency to discourage downstream 
innovation.213  Again, to the extent that open source licenses 
are analyzed as reach-throughs, the relevant analysis will be 
whether the effects of the behavior are inconsistent with patent 
policy or the antitrust rule of reason, depending on the rule 
                                                          
in which purchasers have tried to avoid reach-through royalties on research 
tools), available at http://www.scielosp.org/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext 
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 208. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter 
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 699 
(1998). 
 209. See Feldman, supra note 7, at 439-49. 
 210. See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 249 F. Supp. 2d 216, 
235 (W.D.N.Y. 2003); see also Anne Y. Brody, Rochester v. Searle: Complying 
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Drug Discovery, 22 BIOTECH. L. REPORT 472 (2003). 
 211. See Bayer, 228 F. Supp. 2d 467. 
 212. See NIH Guidelines, supra note 134, at 72,093. 
 213. See Barton, supra note 207, at 121; Eisenberg, supra note 134, at 172; 
Feldman, supra note 7, at 442; Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 208, at 699; see 
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Executive Officer, Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center).    
  
2004] OPEN SOURCE BIOTECHNOLOGY 159 
 
applied. 
IV. ARE THE EFFECTS OF OPEN SOURCE BIOTECH 
LICENSING CONSISTENT WITH PATENT POLICY? 
Many open source biotechnology licenses appear to extend 
the scope of the patent to inventions beyond what is described 
in the patent grant.  The question is whether the expansion is 
impermissible.  One approach to testing whether open source 
agreements are permissible is to examine whether the effects of 
open source agreements are consistent with patent policy.214 
The primary goal of the patent system is to promote the 
progress of science for the benefit of the public.215  The system 
is intended to foster the creation and disclosure of new 
inventions, which will provide long-term benefits for society.216  
In this context, the Supreme Court has noted “[t]he primary 
purpose of our patent system is not reward of the individual 
but the advancement of the arts and sciences.  Its inducement 
is directed to disclosure of advances in knowledge which will be 
beneficial to society; it is not a certificate of merit, but an 
                                                          
 214. See Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 
343 (1971) (noting that the Court has condemned attempts to broaden the 
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private ones), reh’g denied, 538 U.S. 916 (2003). 
 216. See Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 480; Graham, 383 U.S. at 8-9; Sinclair & 
Carroll Co., 325 U.S. at 331. 
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incentive to disclosure.”217 
To accomplish this ultimate goal, we grant patent holders 
limited rights to exclude others from their invention, while 
recognizing that such rights may create negative effects.218  
Nevertheless, the current patent system strikes a balance 
between the positive incentive effects that will redound to the 
public benefit and any negative effects that the creation of 
patent rights may produce.219  Positive and negative effects 
should be evaluated on a system-wide basis, not according to 
whether a particular arrangement would benefit the parties to 
that arrangement.220 
Within this context, open source licenses can be viewed as 
consistent with patent policy.  A patent delays the point at 
which knowledge enters the public domain until the end of the 
patent term.  By ensuring that improvements and other 
developments are immediately available, open source 
accelerates the moment of dedication to public use.  An 
acceleration of the moment at which knowledge is brought to 
the public domain is consistent with the goals of patent policy, 
which are focused on obtaining new inventions for the public 
benefit.221 
On the other hand, one could argue that open source 
clashes with the goals of the patent system by lowering the 
available reward for downstream inventions.  Although the 
primary goal of the patent system is bringing forth knowledge 
for the benefit of the public, the vehicle to accomplish that goal 
is allocation of reward to inventors.  If open source were to 
lower overall incentives to downstream inventors, it could 
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reduce the amount of downstream invention in the long term, 
which would be inconsistent with patent policy. 
Such an analysis, however, fails on several levels.  First, it 
fails to properly measure the incentives offered in the open 
source system.  In the normal vision of the patent system, a 
patent holder’s incentive and reward are measured by the level 
of economic return.  In an open source system, participants also 
are motivated by non-economic factors such as a desire for 
prestige and a desire to satisfy altruistic goals, including 
serving those less fortunate and participating in the 
advancement of science.  An analysis that looks solely at 
traditional economic rewards fails to capture the full dynamic 
of the open source system. 
If rewards such as altruism and prestige are sufficient 
motivations for invention, however, one might ask why a patent 
system is necessary in the first place.  Wouldn’t the lure of 
prestige, helping those less fortunate, and contributing to the 
greater growth of science lure people into making inventions 
such that there would have been no need for a patent system?  
Without a patent system and an open source system, however, 
the promise of non-economic rewards might be illusory.  It 
could be overshadowed by the ability of others to usurp 
inventions through commercial exploitation.  For example, I 
could invent an application that increases crop durability, and 
dedicate my invention to the public benefit.  The dedication 
would be fruitless, however, if others could improve or adapt 
the invention and make those advancements proprietary.  In 
this way, downstream inventors reap economic rewards that 
are in part derived from my inventions.  The mechanism of 
securing rights to produce those economic rewards interferes 
with the dedication of my invention to the public good, which 
would produce my altruistic reward.  It is only the imposition of 
open source agreements that preserves the integrity of the 
altruistic reward, and it is only the patent system that permits 
the development of open source. 
Regarding the concern that open source may reduce 
innovation, one could also argue that open source taps potential 
innovation that the traditional free market cannot reach.  For 
example, those who participate in open source projects, 
software or biotechnology, may do so in free time or in the type 
of intermittent segments that do not lend themselves well to 
commercial enterprise.  From the perspective of the effects on 
the overall patent system, one should consider that open source 
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may harness untapped energy, thereby increasing society’s 
overall innovative potential. 
In addition, rather than simply arguing that open source 
may reduce patent rewards, one should look at the overall 
impact of open source to determine whether it undermines the 
balances implicit in the patent system.  In other words, one 
must consider the effects of open source on the harms of the 
current patent system as well as the benefits of the current 
patent system. 
Although open source biotechnology may reduce 
downstream rewards if only traditional economic rewards are 
measured, open source also reduces the harms side of the 
equation.  Open source cuts through patent thickets that 
threaten to choke off innovation.  In addition, open source does 
not generate the kinds of monopolistic effects that the patent 
system normally produces.  Ordinarily, we tolerate the fact that 
patent holders who have market power will increase price and 
reduce supply during the patent term.222  This is part of the 
necessary harms of the patent system.  In contrast, given that 
open source products are openly available for use, they would 
not produce the same level of restriction of supply as one would 
expect in the patent system. 
There may, of course, be some restriction of supply with 
open source as compared to a system with no intellectual 
property rights.  Use is restricted to those who agree to follow 
the rules of the open source system, which may be a smaller 
pool than those who would use the product if it were in the 
public domain.  Nevertheless, as a general matter, one could 
expect open source to result in far greater usage than under a 
traditional patent licensing arrangement. 
There may be exceptions, however, to the rule that 
traditional patent licensing will substantially restrict supply.  
For example, a patent holder could choose to make its invention 
broadly available on nominal terms.  The Cohen/Boyer patent 
for recombinant technology was reportedly licensed in broad, 
nonexclusive agreements requiring relatively low royalty 
                                                          
 222. See Arrow, supra note 14, at 617 (noting that patent rights produce 
underutilization of information); Kesan & Banik, supra note 13, at 23-24 
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payments.223  That invention and its licensing methods are 
credited with spawning the development of the modern 
biotechnology industry.224  The Cohen/Boyer patent, therefore, 
demonstrates that licensing behavior that does not greatly 
restrict supply is possible under traditional patent licensing, 
even if it may be rare. 
The Cohen/Boyer experience also provides insight into the 
interplay between broad access and the patent system.  First, it 
serves as a reminder that broad access to technology can be 
highly beneficial for encouraging innovation.  In addition, the 
Cohen/Boyer experience suggests that broad, cheap access is 
not necessarily inconsistent with the patent system. 
In short, although an open source system may reduce some 
downstream economic rewards, an open source system 
increases non-economic rewards and incentives.  It may also 
increase the level of invention exploiting untapped innovative 
energy.  Open source licensing also reduces the harms of the 
current patent system by reducing patent thickets and avoiding 
the short-term restriction of supply that one would expect 
under traditional patent licensing.  The ultimate effect of open 
source licensing is to increase the supply of innovation and the 
speed at which such innovation is available for the public 
benefit.  These effects advance the goals of the patent system. 
V. ARE THE EFFECTS OF OPEN SOURCE BIOTECH 
LICENSING CONSISTENT WITH THE ANTITRUST RULE 
OF REASON? 
Alternatively, one could test for patent misuse by 
examining whether the effects of the behavior are 
anticompetitive as measured by the antitrust rule of reason.  
Although the current Federal Circuit misuse standard is 
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described nominally as distinct from antitrust law, antitrust 
formulations infuse the analysis.  In particular, the Federal 
Circuit has held that to test for patent misuse, one should look 
for anticompetitive effects through application of the antitrust 
rule of reason.225  Even under a traditional patent misuse 
analysis, as applied prior to the Federal Circuit’s shift, an 
antitrust analysis can cast light on concerns that might be 
shared by patent policy.226  One should consider, therefore, 
whether open source biotech licensing would be consistent with 
the antitrust rule of reason. 
In the antitrust rule of reason, courts look for market 
power, anticompetitive effects, and proof that the 
anticompetitive effects outweigh the pro-competitive 
benefits.227  A traditional challenge based on antitrust 
principles also would have to establish that the open source 
product and any downstream product constitute two separate 
products.  An improvement on core technology would be more 
difficult to characterize as a separate product than something 
invented using an open source research tool.  Therefore, an 
open source agreement that extends to products invented using 
the research tool is more likely to be suspect under antitrust 
law than an open source agreement that extends only to 
improvements in the core technology. 
As a starting point, an open source licensing arrangement 
would not violate the antitrust rule of reason unless the open 
source product had market power.  Many open source products 
would not have power in a properly defined market because 
significant substitutes for their products would be available.  
For example, the open source operating system Linux does not 
have market power given the availability of other operating 
systems such as Microsoft Windows. 
If an open source group did have market power in a 
particular product market, one could argue, nevertheless, that 
the effects of the project are not anticompetitive within the 
definition of the antitrust rule of reason.  For example, the open 
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source arrangement could be characterized as extending 
beyond the scope of the patent grant by affecting the market for 
downstream goods.  In other words, producers of downstream 
goods would be restricted by the terms of the open source 
license.  A traditional antitrust rule of reason analysis would 
focus on whether the open source group is dominating the 
downstream market with the effect of reducing competition in 
that market. 
On the one hand, the open source group’s effects can be 
characterized as reducing competition in the downstream 
market.  For example, consider the requirement that any 
version of the core technology that contains downstream 
improvements must be made available on open terms upstream 
product.  The behavior could be characterized as an attempt to 
prevent the development of a downstream product, core plus 
improvement, that is available on terms different from its own.  
Such behavior potentially could be seen as reducing 
competition in terms of reducing substitutes for the original 
patent holder’s core products.228  Reducing competition for the 
patent holder’s original product could be seen as 
anticompetitive. 
The open source group, however, is not trying to restrict 
the amount of core plus improvement technology.  It is acting to 
maximize the amount of the improved technology available, by 
ensuring that the improvements remain openly available.  Such 
an effect would be better described as ultimately increasing 
rather than reducing the supply of the downstream product. 
Moreover, to the extent one might argue that open source 
licensing requirements discourage downstream innovation, 
thereby reducing the supply of the downstream product, such 
concerns would be outweighed by the pro-competitive benefits.  
Open source licensing produces substantial pro-competitive 
benefits, including the reduction of patent thickets and an 
increase in the creation and dissemination of ideas without the 
type of short-term restriction of supply associated with 
traditional patenting license arrangements. 
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Other traditional allegations of anticompetitive effects 
could come in the form of a charge that the system resembles a 
patent pool, the combination of which dominates the core 
technology market itself.229  A patent pool is an agreement 
between patent owners to aggregate intellectual property 
rights.230  In simple pools, each party has the right to use all 
technology in the pool without paying royalties.231  In more 
sophisticated pools, members may pay royalties based on the 
relative value of the technology they use or the pool may collect 
royalties from third parties and distribute those royalties using 
a schedule that reflects the significance of the technology 
contributed.232 
Patent pools may have anticompetitive effects because 
pools may help participants coordinate price restraints or 
market divisions.233  When parties who are in competition with 
each other collude to restrain price or divide markets, the 
behavior constitutes a per se violation of federal antitrust 
law.234  In addition, patent pools may facilitate restraints of 
trade in which the members of the pool coordinate to exclude 
competition from other sources.235  Such restraints generally 
would be tested under the rule of reason.236 
Patent pools also may have pro-competitive effects.  Patent 
pools may reduce the transaction costs of negotiating rights 
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when patents block each other or the costs of assembling the 
rights necessary to engage in a particular form of research.237  
They also may facilitate the exchange of scientific information. 
A pooling arrangement could be challenged as patent 
misuse if the pool dominated a particular market.  Although 
the holder of any one patent may not hold market power, the 
group as a whole may have power when combining a number of 
patents that would otherwise compete with each other.  In 
addition, it is possible that a pooling challenge to open source 
licensing could be framed in the following terms: the relevant 
market is not the market for an individual technology but the 
market for the package of licenses necessary to engage in a 
particular form of research.  Within that market, the open 
source project arguably dominates because no one else holds a 
full package.  Even if the open source project were analyzed as 
a pool with market power, however, the project would not 
necessarily violate the antitrust rule of reason.  The pooling 
challenge would be subject to the defenses described above that 
the effects are not anticompetitive and that any anticompetitive 
effects are outweighed substantially by the pro-competitive 
benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
Open source biotechnology projects offer the scientific 
community an opportunity to engage in collaborative research 
in which the latest advancements in biotechnology are openly 
available to a broad research community.  The restrictions 
necessary to maintain the open nature of such projects, 
however, may implicate the doctrine of patent misuse in that 
they appear to use the power of the patent grant to affect 
inventions beyond the teachings of the original patent.  The 
proper analysis for determining whether a patent holder’s 
behavior impermissibly extends the scope of the patent grant 
turns either on whether the effects of the behavior are 
inconsistent with patent policy or on whether the effects of the 
behavior fail the antitrust rule of reason.  Under either test, 
however, open source projects should not constitute misuse. 
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